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1 
Introduction 
The morning of June 18, 1815, on the rolling fields in front of a few small farms 
near the village of Mont-Saint-Jean, in Belgium, the two most successful army 
commanders of their epoch met for the first time on the same battlefield.  Finally, they 
would be able to measure their strategic and tactical abilities against one another.  
Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor of the French, master strategist of countless continental 
battles, had returned from his exile on the island of Elba to crush his British adversary 
once and for all.  Sir Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington, who began his military 
career in India and then solidified his extraordinary reputation against Napoleon’s 
marshals in Spain, came to lead the Allied forces against the Emperor, to stifle the French 
domination of Europe once and for all.  Waterloo was significant historically in that it 
was the decisive battle that ended Napoleon’s aspirations of European hegemony; it was 
significant as a military conflict in that the two major players in the battle had such 
extraordinary reputations and abilities as generals.  This thesis seeks to explore the 
personal contributions of these two prominent generals to the Allied victory and the 
French defeat at the battle of Waterloo.  
Napoleon came from a humble background. Born to a Corsican lawyer in 1769, 
he received his education at the École Militaire in Paris.  He developed a plethora of 
knowledge and proved himself to be extremely self-motivated and ambitious: an 
advantageous combination for a military officer.  In 1795, he led the violent suppression 
of the anti-revolutionary Vendémiaire movement, the success of which hinged on his 
specialized skill as an artillery commander.  This victory over the rebellious royalists led 
to his promotion to Commander of the Army of the Interior and then of the Army of Italy.  
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After several successful campaigns he staged a coup on the government to ensure his 
election to the position of First Consul.  In 1804, Pope Pius VII crowned him Emperor of 
the French at Notre Dame, in Paris.  In a matter of a few years Napoleon had transformed 
himself from a poor, disagreeable, foreign student to the effective ruler of France.  After 
conquering almost every major power in continental Europe, Napoleon turned east, 
toward Moscow. After fighting an extremely costly campaign in Russia to no avail, he 
returned to continental Europe in 1812.  In 1813, he faced a huge defeat against the Sixth 
Coalition, an alliance comprised of Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Sweden.  After a series 
of smaller conflicts in France, he abdicated in 1814, banished to the Island of Elba.  
Arthur Wellesley was born in Ireland to a family of English descent in 1769, the 
same year as Napoleon.  Unlike Napoleon, Wellesley, the third son of Lord Mornington, 
came from an aristocratic background.  He studied at Eton but his family removed him 
from the academic track before he graduated and sent to the Military Academy at Anger, 
in France—the unfortunate fate of a third son outshone by his older brothers’ brilliance.  
He quickly received promotion in the army, after alternating a political career in the Irish 
parliament with his military duties.  Finally accepting a solely military life, he set out for 
India as a colonel in 1797.  After defeating the Tipoo Sultan of Mysore and winning a 
great victory at the battle of Assaye, Wellesley returned to Britain in 1805.  After a few 
more years of politics, he left for the Iberian Peninsula where he proved his strategic and 
tactical prowess against Napoleon’s marshals, working with the local armies and the 
Spanish guerillas to purge Spain and Portugal of the French occupiers.  During the 
Peninsular War (1808-1814), Wellesley perfected his reverse-slope infantry technique, 
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utilizing his infantry to their maximum potential.1  At the battle of Talavera, he earned 
the title, Viscount of Wellington.  Following Napoleon’s first abdication, the crown 
created Wellington a Duke.  He accepted an ambassadorial post in Paris and then a 
position as the representative for Great Britain at the Congress of Vienna.  However, 
when the European leaders discovered that Napoleon had escaped, they sent Wellington 
to oppose him, leading an Allied army composed of British, Saxe-Weimar, Nassauers, 
Netherlanders, and troops of the King’s German Legion (KGL), in conjunction with 
Marshal Blücher, leading the Prussian Army.2 
In any battle, a general’s personal leadership has a monumental influence on the 
morale of his troops.  Seeing a leader poised for battle, calm, collected, and in control, 
reduces the feelings of fear and panic among his men; unfortunately, the reverse is also 
true, so it is essential that a commander remain composed throughout the battle.  Soldiers 
facing the possibility of death or mutilation want to be able to trust that their commanders 
will do all that is in their power to ensure that their service and sacrifice will not be in 
vain.  A commander’s presence in the thick of battle, actively leading from the front lines 
comforts a soldier; he can see his commander’s confidence in the success of the mission, 
as well as the assurance that he is in a position to modify his tactics in response to enemy 
movements.  It is difficult for a commander to inspire in his men the same sense of 
                                                 
1
 A technique in which an officer deploys his infantry on the opposite side of a slope, 
using the slope to defend the infantry from enemy artillery, brought forward only when 
their firepower would be effective.  This reverse-slope technique is described later in 
further detail. 
2
 The Seventh Coalition against Napoleon included Russia and Austria as well, but the 
Austrian army stationed in Italy and the Russians en route from Russia, were too far away 
to have been considered an immediate threat to Napoleon’s Armée du Nord. 
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confidence while leading from the periphery. At Waterloo, the personal leadership of the 
two generals and their involvement in the battle greatly influenced its outcome. 
Aside from the political decisiveness of the battle of Waterloo, its significance 
lies largely in the reputations of Napoleon and Wellington for their impeccable quality of 
personal leadership.  Thomas Carlyle, the nineteenth century historian who championed 
the “Great Man Theory” of history, stated that, “all things that we see standing 
accomplished in the world are properly the outer material result, the practical realization 
and embodiment, of Thoughts that dwelt in the Great Men sent into the world: the soul of 
the whole world’s history…were the history of these.”3  This theory, while generally 
viewed by modern historians as somewhat archaic, was certainly relevant in the 
nineteenth century, at the time of its development.  The military reforms of the eighteenth 
century shifted the focus of the military onto the importance of the individual soldier as a 
part of the larger military structure.  This radical new focus on the individual allowed for 
the invention of the Great Man Theory.  Although structural elements such as technology, 
logistics, finance, and social organization certainly affect historical change and the 
outcomes of battles, for these particular battles, the Great Man Theory seems exceedingly 
relevant.   
Napoleon was arguably one of the greatest military leaders to ever live, and yet at 
Waterloo he was defeated by Wellington, a commander who, doubtlessly not as well 
known in the modern era, had earned a similarly superior reputation.  In order to fully 
comprehend the role that personal leadership played in the battle of Waterloo it is first 
necessary to place personal leadership within the context of the early nineteenth century.  
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 Thomas Carlyle, On Heroes, Hero-Worship, & the Heroic in History (Berkley Calif: 
University of California Press, 1993), 3.  
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First, I will examine the elements of the late eighteenth century military reforms which 
created an environment in which Napoleon and Wellington could effectively cultivate 
their leadership skills.  Second, I will analyze each commander’s personal leadership 
earlier in his career, Wellington at the battle of Salamanca (1812) and Napoleon at the 
battle of Austerlitz (1805), revealing the high level of military genius present in both 
men.  Finally, I will examine the personal leadership contributions of each man at the 
battle of Waterloo to demonstrate the extent to which the two commanders remained 
consistent with or deviated from their previous leadership styles.  The two armies were 
reasonably evenly matched; thus, the questions to be asked are: what was it about the two 
generals that helped influence the events of June 18 to unfold in the manner that they did?  
How did the two leaders conduct their armies?  How did their personal leadership 
influence the tactical decisions made on June 18?   This thesis will argue that, compared 
with their earlier careers, Wellington’s consistency and Napoleon’s inconsistency greatly 
influenced the Allied victory and the French defeat at the battle of Waterloo. 
 
Late Eighteenth Century Military Reform and Personal Leadership 
 
Before discussing the specific contributions of Napoleon and Wellington at 
Waterloo, it is necessary to examine the newfound significance of personal leadership 
and its effect on battles within the context of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century, coinciding with the army’s increased focus on the individual during that period.  
Stemming from the egalitarian principles of the French Revolution, military reformers of 
the late eighteenth century began to abandon the traditional practice of granting offices 
only to aristocrats, who reputedly embodied the all-important principle of honor, and 
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began to enact measures to grant offices based on merit to men of all backgrounds.  At 
the same time “Military Romanticism”, a new overarching theory of war that military 
theorists began to develop at the time, emphasized the important role of the psychological 
and human aspects of warfare, for the first time examining the soldier as an individual.  
Drawing on this newfound attention on the role of the individual, Napoleon was able to 
create an army founded on the principle of personal honor, driven by national pride.  The 
emphasis on the individual increased the psychological value of a commander’s personal 
leadership over his men and provided the structural framework in which Napoleon and 
Wellington could supplement their abilities as battlefield commanders with the personal 
elements of leadership that appealed to the individual soldier, earning his respect.   
The theory of Military Romanticism contradicted previous conceptions of war.  
Historian, John Lynn claims that “instead of viewing war as primarily obedient to the 
logic of science, Military Romanticism indentified war as a human phenomenon ruled by 
psychology and will.”4  Among the champions of the new theory of Military 
Romanticism was the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz.  This newfound 
emphasis on the psychological aspects of war increased the importance of a commander’s 
personal leadership in addition to his traditionally defined role as a strategist and 
tactician.  Rather than viewing armies as impersonal units of war, military theorists began 
to view them as collections of individual soldiers.  Under this new theory, simple soldiers 
started to be considered of value, theorists began to argue that these common fighters, 
and not just aristocratic army officers, performed important functions for the army.   As a 
result, officers could begin to demand more of their men in terms of dedication, 
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 John A. Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture (Boulder, Colo.: Westview 
Press, 2003), 193.  
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enthusiasm, and initiative.5  This in turn contributed to the overall change in attitude of 
the soldier; he understood that, no matter how humble his background, he had a personal 
self-worth.  Napoleon, in particular, capitalized on this sentiment; “he displayed an 
outwardly caring attitude toward [his soldiers] that brought out their devotion.  He 
remembered, or pretended to remember, their names and their deeds.  He made an art of 
the familiar word or gesture, meant to flatter the common soldier and to bind him to 
Bonaparte.”6   The importance of the psychological aspects of war made the role of the 
commanding officer more important than ever before, as he became responsible for the 
morale of the men under his command.  
The French Revolution called into question the traditionally accepted view that 
distinguished birth entitled the nobility to affluence and advantages, championing instead 
the egalitarian principles of liberté, égalité, and fraternité.  This new inclination towards 
meritocracy had begun during the latter half of the eighteenth century.  For the first time, 
following France’s humiliating defeat in the Seven Years War, “it became possible to 
regard birth and merit as opposing principles.”7  During the Revolution, the French 
people questioned the right of the nobility to special privileges.  An important noble 
prerogative had been the right to serve as military officers—the vast majority of positions 
in the army officer corps were filled by nobles.  In addition, presentation at the court of 
Versailles was necessary to be promoted to the highest military ranks.   Being an army 
officer was a sign of elevated status, thus many aristocrats sought high positions in the 
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 John A. Lynn, “Toward an Army of Honor: The Moral Evolution of the French Army, 
1789-1815,” French Historical Studies 16 (Spring 1989):152-173, 172. 
7
 Jay M. Smith, The Culture of Merit: Nobility, Royal Service, and the Making of 
Absolute Monarchy in France, 1600-1789 (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan 
Press, 1996), 225. 
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military for the social prestige and for fear of ridicule for remaining in a lower position of 
command. Obviously, such motivations did not necessarily produce competent 
commanders.  By contrast, officers selected on merit tended to perform their duties 
efficiently.  In 1787, King Louis XVI of France moved in the direction of merit-based 
officer selection, when he established the Conseil de la Guerre.  This council became 
responsible for the review of officer candidates based on merit; it required that officers 
keep a record of their credentials and to a certain extent regulated the process of officer 
selection, which, as just noted, consisted of the king arbitrarily granting the highest 
positions in the military to the nobles of his court.8  This movement towards merit-based 
officer selection greatly increased an army’s fighting power and placed a stronger 
significance on the human elements of war.   
While the egalitarian principles of the French Revolution were not implemented 
to the same degree in Great Britain, the British military began to adopt a slightly more 
merit-based officer selection process around the same time.  David Gates asserts that with 
regards to the officer selection process: 
Affluence, if only on a comparatively modest scale, remained a 
prerequisite, but the landed gentry could not preserve its dominance of the 
army’s hierarchy; men from other sectors of society, foremost among 
them the prosperous middle classes who had emerged in the aftermath of 
the agricultural and industrial revolutions, accounted for a growing 
proportion of the officer corps.9 
 
Although still selecting officers from the wealthier classes who could afford to buy 
commissions—due to the staggeringly high costs of maintaining the British colonial 
possessions as well as fighting the wars on the European continent— the army began to 
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 Smith, The Culture of Merit, 252. 
9
 David Gates, “The Transformation of the Army 1783-1815,” in The Oxford History of 
the British Army, ed. David Chandler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 142. 
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require competence from their officers to a much higher degree than had previously been 
enforced.10  Although driven more by a desperate need for order and efficiency in the 
army, rather than true ideas of equality, the British nevertheless moved toward a more 
merit-based officer corps.  
Following the Revolution, Napoleon implemented a system of motivation 
designed to feed off of an individual’s sense of pride and self-worth.  Napoleon’s post-
Revolution army was motivated by honor, a self-propelled desire to work toward the 
national good.  This concept of honor, traditionally viewed as a relationship between the 
king and the nobility, began to be viewed as an ideal to which all Frenchmen ought to 
aspire.  Jay Smith argues that the political culture of the late 1780s recognized “the equal 
potential for honor, and…the natural nobility, enjoyed by every French citizen.  The 
moral unity that bound citizens, a unity rooted in national traditions of honor and in a 
virtuous commitment to the well-being of the nation, implied an equality that required the 
elimination, or mitigation, of legal barriers between citizens.”11  Reflecting the 
individualist nature of the reformed military of the time, “Napoleon encouraged the 
personal interest of the soldier and strived to line it to that of the Empire by a system of 
rewards and preferments.”12  This interweaving of the personal interests of the soldier 
with the interests of the Empire bound the soldier’s loyalty to the army and to its glorious 
leader.  Napoleon also wed the concept of honor to the cause of the nation, thereby 
inspiring his soldiers to sacrifice themselves on the battlefield as part of the nationalist 
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 The cost of war for Britain at the time consumed up to 90 percent of the government 
revenue per year. Gates, “The Transformation of the Army,” 142. 
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 Jay M. Smith, Nobility Reimagined: The Patriotic Nation in Eighteenth-Century 
France (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2005), 263.   
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 Lynn, “Toward an Army of Honor,” 153. 
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cause.  He used a specific set of honors as incentive for his soldiers to perform well: 
promotion, arms of honor, the Legion of Honor, and the Imperial Guard.13  The French 
nation considered each of these elements a personal distinction which involved immense 
social capital; through these means soldiers could come closer to the Emperor, himself.  
The soldiers regarded these personal distinctions of honor very highly.  They bound the 
individual’s identity to that of his military unit.  To be a member of Napoleon’s elite 
fighting force, the Imperial Guard, or to wear the cross of the Legion of Honor was the 
highest possible honor.  Thus, Napoleon successfully used personal honor as a means of 
instilling loyalty within each soldier, to his country and his Emperor. 
The composition of the French army at the turn of the nineteenth century changed 
dramatically from what it had been just a few years previously.  Following the French 
Revolution, the tools of war evolved from the traditional king’s army into a “popular 
conscript army” where men were conscripted to fight in an army of the people: war 
became the concern of the French people as a whole.14  The process of conscription 
allowed enormous French armies to form, and forced other major powers to increase the 
size of their forces in return; between 1800 and 1814, Napoleon raised two million 
soldiers through conscription.15  The procedure of conscription led to the 
professionalization of the French army; John Lynn explains that, “Time in service also 
helped to foster this sense of isolation [from the French civil community] by creating a 
new professionalism.  The conscript of 1793, still a civilian at heart, had become a 
                                                 
13
 Lynn, “Toward an Army of Honor,” 167. 
14
 Lynn, Battle, 184. 
15
 Lynn, “Toward an Army of Honor,” 158. 
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professional soldier by 1797…”16  These professional soldiers increased the overall 
efficacy of Napoleon’s army.   
In contrast to the French army, the British army did not have the same process of 
conscription; it relied on the recruitment of volunteers, seduced with promises of money, 
glory, and adventure.  Such was the success of the French conscription process that the 
British had to resort to heavy recruitment in order to raise the numbers that would be 
necessary to oppose the French forces.  Often the army tried to persuade militiamen, 
originally intended for home defense, to join the regular army.  This provided an extra 
74,000 British troops between 1807 and 1812.17  However, these numbers still needed the 
fortification of foreign troops; by 1813, 52,000 men, one-fifth of the total army, were 
foreign troops.18  The difficulties of recruitment, foot soldiers usually drawn from the 
lowest level of society, and the large presence of foreign troops, hindered to a certain 
extent the nationalist sentiments that pervaded the French army.  Nevertheless, 
Wellington still capitalized on the principles of Military Romanticism, by taking the 
individual soldiers’ needs into account.  According to one historian, Wellington 
maintained order by, “satisfying the troops’ basic needs, such as clothing, shelter, 
adequate medical care, and regular pay and rations.”19  He treated his soldiers as 
individuals, despite their humble and often despicable backgrounds, and expected their 
loyalty and obedience in return. 
The newfound focus on the merit of army officers implied a level of general 
scrutiny to which officers were not subjected before the late eighteenth century military 
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 Lynn, “Toward an Army of Honor,” 159-160. 
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 Gates, “The Transformation of the Army,” 137. 
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 Gates, “The Transformation of the Army,” 138. 
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 Gates, “The Transformation of the Army,” 145. 
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reforms.  The focus on the individual in the army introduced the idea that an officer 
should possess and demonstrate the qualities he seeks to inspire in his men.  For example, 
during Napoleon’s Egyptian campaign in 1799, disease wrought havoc on his army.  In 
order to provide for the ill and wounded, he ordered that the horses and vehicles of 
transport be left behind and that everyone should march on foot.  When an equerry, 
assuming that Napoleon had excluded himself from this order, asked the general which 
horse should be kept for him, “[Napoleon] struck the equerry across the face with a 
horse-whip, and shouted: ‘Everybody is to go on foot! I shall be the first to go on foot! 
What?  You don’t know what an order is? Get out!’”20  He would not allow himself the 
luxury of a horse when his soldiers trudged along in misery in the sweltering desert heat.  
Shared discomfort created a bond between an officer and his soldiers; the men felt that 
they could relate to their commanding officer through such a gesture, quite a progressive 
step from the rigid lines of distinction between the traditional aristocratic officer and 
common foot soldier. 
Military competence, sound judgment, and self-confidence became essential to 
the officer chosen based on his merit.  Both Napoleon and Wellington were widely 
respected for their strategic and tactical competence; their men respected them because of 
their merit, not as a result of an archaic practice of birthright.  In fact, neither man came 
from the top of the social elite, Napoleon being the son of a humble Corsican lawyer, and 
Wellington the third son of an Irish lord.  Wellington’s ability to inspire his men was 
uncanny.  In 1811, while commanding the British army in Spain before the battle of 
Fuentes d’Onoro, Wellington had been called to Marshal Beresford’s Corps at Badajoz.  
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 Eugene Tarlé, Bonaparte, trans. John Cournos (London: Martin Secker & Warburg 
Ltd., 1937), 70. 
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Rifleman Kincaid remarked that, “as a general action seemed now to be inevitable, we 
anxiously longed for the return of Lord Wellington…as we would rather see his long 
nose in the fight than a reinforcement of ten thousand men any day.”21  Merit-based 
officer selection produced two commanders, distinguished solely for their personal 
abilities to command.  
 The duty of a commander centered around ingenuity and creativity on the 
battlefield.  If he did not have a thorough understanding battlefield and the relative 
strengths of the two armies, then he could not hope to formulate a successful battle plan.  
Once he carefully developed a plan of action suitable to his forces and to the specific 
nature of the terrain, he needed to resign himself to the possibility that his plan would 
likely change throughout the course of the battle, based on enemy actions.  A good 
general should not stubbornly adhere to his original plan in the event that the enemy 
would do something unexpected which refuted it.  S.L.A. Marshall, viewing this from a 
more modern perspective, claimed that, “the test of fitness to command is the ability to 
think clearly in the face of unexpected contingency or opportunity.  Improvisation is of 
the essence of initiative in all combat just as initiative is the outward showing of the 
power of decision.”22  If a leader has the ability to improvise logical battle plans, adapting 
them to the movements of the enemy troops, he can efficiently control the battle and will 
not become bewildered when the events of the battle do not fit perfectly with his original 
conception.  Battles usually do not follow a leader’s original plan because it is the enemy 
leader’s responsibility to elude him and engage in the unexpected.  Thus it is the leader’s 
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first imperative during a battle to try to anticipate the enemy’s actions as they change 
continuously.  
Focusing on the individual rather than the military unit as an impartial whole did 
not mean that the military unit somehow lost importance; rather, the significance of the 
military unit increased in importance, because it was composed of individuals, holding 
one another accountable.  Napoleon encouraged the individual soldier to embrace his 
primary unit identity.  He established the ordinaire, or primary group to instill the group 
mentality in his men; each ordinaire of about fifteen men had an officer, the chef 
d’ordinaire, who shared in the daily lives of his men, working, eating, and sleeping 
together.23  This group solidarity continues to be relevant in the armed forces in modern 
warfare; Marshall claims that a soldier would rather go unarmed into battle with a group 
of his comrades than to go into battle alone but armed with the most advanced weapons.24  
From a psychological standpoint, the group dynamic gives man confidence; “the pack is 
attacking and the problem of individual security does not arise.”25  The soldier feels that 
he is a part of a greater force, and becomes less intimidated facing the large enemy force 
than he would be with the mindset of a single soldier up against an enemy army.   
A greater sense of identification of the individual soldier with his unit had also 
been made possible by the development of uniforms.  The standardization of uniforms 
and weapons was a relatively recent occurrence; uniforms in the French army had only 
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been made compulsory for officers in 1682, and for men of the ranks later on.26  The 
distinction of one unit from another through insignia and colors as Christy Pichichero 
observed, began to play a significant role in group identity.  Having distinguishing 
regimental colors, “[made] the actions of a regiment visible to all others on a battlefield, 
evoking praise and emulation of a regiment that fought courageously and shame and 
condemnation for a regiment that cowered or fled from combat.”27  Napoleon used 
regimental colors to empower his soldiers with pride for their units, recording the 
distinguishing feats and battles of the unit on its banner.28  The flags, and the famous 
golden eagles attached to their flag poles, became a symbol that directly linked military 
units to their Emperor; in his speech during the presentation of these colors at a flag 
ceremony in 1804, Napoleon proclaimed: “Soldiers, here are your flags.  These eagles 
will always serve as your rallying point.  They will go everywhere your Emperor will 
judge necessary for the defense of the throne and his people.  You swear to sacrifice your 
like to defend them and to maintain them constantly by your courage on the road to 
victory; swear it!”29   Group identification increased a soldier’s incentive to do well in 
battle, both to uphold his unit’s honor and for fear of disappointing his fellow soldiers.  In 
some cases group identity became a part of each soldier’s physical person through copper 
legion plates attached to ones uniform or regiment numbers tattooed to each soldier’s 
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right hand, starting with the leadership and moving down the ranks.30  These symbols 
provided a tangible means of binding soldiers to one another and to their Emperor, 
greatly increasing their sense of group identity.  The sense of esprit de corps produced by 
training day after day with the same group of men becomes extremely important in the 
face of battle, when the men in one’s unit are the means by which a soldier can stay alive. 
 In terms of general battlefield command, a leader must have a certain 
organizational competence.  He must be able to deploy his forces to maximize their 
efficiency, using their potential to the greatest advantage and reinforcing areas of 
weakness.  A leader must avoid leaving units exposed and vulnerable by protecting them 
with features of the terrain, deploying into stronger formations, or reinforcing them with 
other types of troops.  Infantry protected by cavalry or artillery will feel more confident 
facing the enemy than would infantry alone, without other types of troops to protect 
them.  If there is a particularly weak position in a battlefield, due to topography or 
proximity to the enemy, then the deployment of veteran troops in the weak location, 
rather than inexperienced ones can prevent a possible panic situation; veteran troops are 
less likely to be scared away by the trials of battle in a difficult strategic position.  
Veterans are a useful asset on a battlefield because they are living proof for inexperienced 
soldiers that men actually survive battles, but even their strength and vitality has limits, 
so a leader must have a supply of fresh reserve troops waiting to relieve them.  The front 
lines need to continue to fight effectively throughout the course of the battle, so rotating 
fresh troops in to relieve the exhausted men in the thick of the action is important to 
                                                 
30
 Pichichero, “Le Soldat Sensible”, 566.  
17 
ensure maximum efficiency and to preserve the morale and emotional stability of one’s 
troops.  
 In order to guarantee that his orders are carried out efficiently, a general must 
have a firm command over his subordinates.  He needs to possess fast, calculated 
decision-making skills in order to maintain control over the different aspects of a battle.  
A leader should be firm in his resolve, but not so much so that he follows through on a 
decision after it has ceased to be beneficial to the overall mission.  He must follow his 
intuition, which if sound, will prevent cognitive dissonance, or “the inability to cope with 
information, knowledge, or beliefs which conflict with a decision already made and thus 
recognize that a situation has changed, that a plan or course of action may no longer be 
valid.”31  It is necessary that a leader be able to distinguish when a plan has ceased to be 
effectual; faulty tactics lead to defeat.  Once a decision has been reached, a leader needs 
to take action quickly by giving his subordinates clear instructions to follow.  Battles are 
confusing; with all of the different troop movements through the noise and the smoke, it 
is difficult to know what to do without clear, concise orders.  A leader’s instructions must 
be brief, clear and to the point in order to reduce the possibility of miscommunication, 
which could lead to a unit’s destruction.    
 In battle, a leader needed to achieve the primary objective, however, in the spirit 
of Military Romanticism, he also had an obligation to look out for the welfare of his men.  
The rotation of reserve troops to the front lines helped to alleviate the strains of battle and 
prevent irreparable damage to morale from leaving troops in the line of fire too long.  
Nineteenth century battles typically concentrated forces within the space of a few miles.  
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Units lined up near one another and the whole battle could be surveyed by a man on 
horseback relatively easily.  Thus, a general could send aide-de-camps anywhere on the 
battlefield in a matter of minutes.  In this manner he could efficiently move reserves in to 
relieve his troops, while still overseeing the main action in the front.  It is crucial that a 
leader be able to survey the entire battlefield to determine when replacements are 
necessary and where the relief is most needed.  A well timed relief force can define 
victory and defeat.  Napoleon knew better than most the powerful influence that morale 
has on soldiers’ performance in battle.   In an 1808 report on the situation in Spain, 
Napoleon wrote: “In war, three quarters are the affairs of morale, the balance of tangible 
forces counts only for the remaining quarter.”32  If one has an enormous force which is 
easily intimidated and unmotivated it can easily be defeated by a smaller, more 
determined force.  To a certain extent, the men’s morale dictates their performance in 
battle, thus it is crucial that a commander maintain positive morale in his troops to ensure 
an effective fighting force.  
A commander asserts control over a battle by ensuring that his entire army can 
feel his influence.  Napoleon himself once stated that, “in an army corps the eye of the 
commander must remedy everything.  Captains and officers, whatever their merits might 
be in other respects, are constantly in a state of carelessness if the presence of the 
commander does not continually make itself felt.”33  A leader’s duty within battle is to 
provide the structure and clarity through his orders and his diligence so that his troops do 
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not feel lost or isolated amid the confusion and destruction.  The smoke of a battle makes 
it difficult for soldiers to see the other men in their own units, so a battle is sometimes 
heard and felt more than seen; it is “a fog for the men who fight.”34  Samuel Hays asserts 
that, “the soldier’s confidence that his leaders are tactically proficient and combat-wise, 
makes it easier for him to advance toward the unknown.”35  Thus it is important for a 
leader to make his presence known to his men and to assure them that he is competent 
and working in their best interests.  Wellington, whose mere presence on a battlefield 
inspired his men so much, was sorely missed when he was forced to leave his troops 
under the command of a lesser general.  In such a situation in 1811, Wellington had been 
called to Badajoz.  Edward Pakenham, stationed at Alamada, wrote that: “In Almaida the 
Enemy have left a Garrison, and they will attempt to relieve it; we shall therefore soon 
have some work, and I sincerely trust the intrepidity of our troops may in some small 
degree make up for the incalculable loss of our Leader.”36  If Wellington directed a battle, 
his men felt more confident in its outcome, by his presence alone; without him, they felt 
uneasy.  A commander is the great mover in battle; given the size and style of nineteenth 
century battles, he should direct the battle from the forefront.  Napoleon, particularly in 
his earlier years, maintained a tight control over his battles and ensured that his presence 
could be felt by every man on the battlefield.  Jonathon Riley attests that, “There is no 
doubt that his personal presence was a huge force multiplier…French troops took heart, 
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and their enemies despaired.”37  Napoleon’s troops took comfort in his unprecedented 
success as a commander; they felt secure, knowing that he led them into battle, 
personally.  A leader’s good reputation will be an advantage, but it must be reinforced on 
the field through clear, well-informed orders and active decision making. 
For men to have faith in their commander, he must display courage, fortitude and 
levelheadedness in the face of danger.  General Sherman defined true courage as, “a 
perfect sensibility of the measure of danger, and a mental willingness to incur it…”38  If a 
commander keeps a cool head during a battle, this sense of calm and control will trickle 
down through the ranks; if a commander openly displays fear or panic about a situation, 
those emotions will also reach the men, who will assume that their commander’s panic is 
an indication of incompetent leadership, dangerous for the soldiers it affects.  A 
commander must be free to move around a battlefield, willing to accept the possibility of 
personal danger in the line of duty.  During the battle of Friedland in 1807, Napoleon 
exemplified the courage he desired to elicit in his men; “Napoleon personally directed the 
battle.  When a bomb sped by his head and a soldier standing beside him ducked, the 
Emperor, who had remained immobile during the flight of the projectile, turned to him 
and said: ‘If that bomb had been predestined for you, you could have hidden a hundred 
feet underground and it would have still got you.’”39  At the battle of Assaye in India, 
1803, Wellington displayed a similar fortitude.  Colin Campbell of the 78th wrote: “The 
General was in the thick of the action the whole time…I never saw a man so cool and 
collected as he was…though I can assure you, till our troops got the orders to advance the 
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fate of the day seemed doubtful…”40  In order to be in a position from which he can 
properly direct all the elements of the battle at any given time, a commander must be 
willing to incur a degree of personal danger.  The fortification of morale achieved by a 
commander’s personal attention is invaluable to his men’s confidence and battle efficacy.  
As long as the commander can continue to conduct the battle he should encourage his 
men as much as possible, without taking foolish risks.  Personal leadership in combat 
allows a commander to relate to his men and allows them to relate to him as well.  They 
feel secure knowing that they are being led by a competent man who would not deploy 
them in perilous positions where he would not dare tread himself.  
 The military reform of the late eighteenth century paved the way for Napoleon 
and Wellington to develop unprecedented reputations as military commanders.  The new 
focus on the psychological elements of battle and their implications when considering the 
morale of the individual soldier created a welcoming environment for the strong personal 
leadership of these two commanders.  In their military careers before Waterloo, both 
generals displayed an acceptance of personal danger in order to effectively manage a 
battle and to inspire their troops.  Their mere presence on a battlefield could induce men 
to face the enemy, despite their fears.  Their personal leadership in battle played an 
important role in their victories; with the newfound emphasis on psychology and the 
individual brought about by the late eighteenth century military reforms, one might 
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wonder if the victories of Napoleon and Wellington could have been achieved under the 
command of other, less diligent leaders.   
 
Earlier Careers: Austerlitz and Salamanca 
In their earlier careers, both Napoleon and Wellington proved their worth as 
battlefield commanders, tacticians, strategists, and effective leaders.   Napoleon fought 
the battle of Austerlitz (1805), one of his most definitive battles, with finesse and 
precision; he lured the Russian army into his trap and equalized their superior numbers 
through a cunning use of deception and misleading terrain features.  Furthermore, his 
victory at Austerlitz came at the opportune moment for a heavily indebted France.  
Wellington’s victory at Salamanca in 1812, surprised the French Armée du Portugal; its 
marshal, Marmont, assumed that Wellington, famous for his skill in defensive battle, 
would not risk an offensive attack, particularly given the strong French presence 
elsewhere in the Iberian Peninsula.  However, when the opportunity presented itself, 
Wellington did not hesitate to seize it and deal a harsh blow to the French forces, shifting 
the line of fire from the outskirts of Portugal deep into the Spanish countryside.  
Comparing the combat effectiveness of these two great commanders in their earlier 
careers—at Austerlitz and Salamanca—illustrates central aspects of their skill as leaders 
and will put the later battle of Waterloo into a larger perspective.  
 
Napoleon: The Battle of Austerlitz, December 2, 1805 
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The Battle of Austerlitz, was one of Napoleon’s most dramatic victories, using his 
small army to defeat an enemy almost twice its size.41  Napoleon fought Austerlitz with 
the artistry of an experienced master of warfare, commanding his troops efficiently and 
effectively.   The battle was one of the most decisive victories of the Napoleonic Wars.  It 
could not have happened at a better time, because, due to the enormous French debt from 
Napoleon’s earlier campaigns, only a decisive victory could save France from utter ruin.  
The French army was in a shabby state, in desperate need of fresh supplies, food, horses, 
wagons, shoes, and winter clothes if it was to go on campaign again, and his soldiers had 
not been paid in months.  France was not in a state to bear the financial burden of another 
campaign.  One historian claims that, “In any event, one thing was certainly clear: The 
French people were insistent on peace, now.  If [Napoleon] was to wage war, it would 
have to be brief and brilliant.”42  With the urgency of an absolute victory ever present in 
his mind, Napoleon moved into the German states to oppose the Allied army of the Third 
Coalition, which had been formed to prevent his imperial expansion. 43  The Allied army, 
comprised of 226,000 Russian and Austrian soldiers, significantly outnumbered 
Napoleon’s maximum force of 152,000.44  With such a staggering disparity in numbers, 
Napoleon needed to try to attack the different forces of the Allied army separately, before 
they had a chance to combine to outnumber him.  In an address to the Grande Armée 
from his headquarters at Augsburg on October 23, Napoleon explained, “soldiers, we 
have difficult marches yet before us, fatigue and hardships of all kinds.  Whatever 
                                                 
41
 For a map of the battlefield of Austerlitz, see Map 1 in the Appendix, p.81. 
42
 Alan Schom, Napoleon Bonaparte (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1997), 392. 
43
 The Third Coalition, comprised of Russia, Austria, Britain, Sweden, and some smaller 
German states, was signed into being in April, 1805. 
44
 Schom, Napoleon Bonaparte, 403. 
24 
obstacles may confront us, we shall overcome them, and we shall not rest until we have 
planted our eagles upon the territory of our enemies.”45  Despite the hardships of the 
campaign, his men still trusted their commander to lead them to victory, because they 
respected his reputation for excellence.   
 At the battle of Austerlitz, Napoleon proved his tactical genius.  He realized that, 
with the vast numbers of Allied soldiers available to oppose him, he needed to fight a 
decisive battle quickly, before another 80,000 troops under the command of Archduke 
Charles could march up from Italy to reinforce the 86,000 already under the personal 
command of Tsar Alexander.46  In addition to the pressure of provoking battle before his 
opposition gathered reinforcements, the supplies that sustained his army were rapidly 
depleting.  Napoleon chose to regroup his forces near the city of Brünn, 60 miles north of 
Vienna, in present day Czech Republic.  Reconnaissance of the area revealed a terrain 
naturally formed for defensive battle.  Although the French tended to favor offensive 
battles, because they believed that offensive fighting had a better effect on morale, in this 
case, Napoleon saw an opportunity to lure the Allied army into a trap, to end his brief 
campaign in one sudden, virulent blow.   He chose an area between Brünn and the town 
of Austerlitz, twelve miles to the east.  Between these two towns lies the Goldbach brook, 
which flows through a deep, narrow valley in a heavily wooded area surrounded by small 
rivulets and high, rocky hills. The main road connecting Brünn and Vienna lies to the 
west of the Goldbach brook, and the road connecting Brünn to Olmütz forms the northern 
border of the battlefield.  The large plateau of Pratzen lies to the east of the hills. The 
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towns of Sokolnitz and Tellnitz and the frozen ponds of Satschan and Menitz formed the 
southernmost boundary of the battlefield.47  This location, while less than ideal for 
massive troop movement, is perfectly suited for close combat fighting.  Napoleon 
developed his battle plan with the object of luring the Austro-Russian army into close 
contact battle, which would greatly reduce the advantage of their greater numbers.  He 
began by deceiving the Allies as to the true strength and morale of the French army to 
urge them onto the offensive.   Philippe-Paul Ségur, one of Napoleon’s aides de camp, 
wrote that on the night of December 1, “The Emperor…ordered Murat to ride out with 
some cavalry, to act anxious and hesitant, and then break away as suddenly, as if afraid, 
in order to further inflate the assumption of the enemy.”48  This display of “weakness” on 
the night before the battle lulled the Allied leadership into a false sense of security.  In a 
display of loyalty and support for their emperor, the French soldiers lit small fires in his 
honor as he surveyed his lines the night before the battle.  Ségur remarks that, “The 
Russians imagined that we were burning our shelters, they thought that we were going to 
retreat; their presumption was strengthened.”49  Ironically, the display of French pride 
and morale gave the Allies the exact opposite impression.  Instead of perceiving the 
French soldiers as confident, enthusiastic adversaries, they assumed that they were close 
to capitulating. 
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Napoleon engineered this façade of the French army in order to ensure that the 
Allies would feel overly confident in their attack.  Although the Allied army 
outnumbered his own, Napoleon planned to use the terrain around the Goldbach brook to 
his advantage.  If he could ensure that the Allies would be obliged to fight in the narrow, 
wooded, defiles surrounding the Goldbach brook then he would have both, “economy of 
force and…local numerical superiority” by forcing the enemy to fight in smaller units, 
which his forces would be able to fight at even odds. 50  On November 30, Napoleon 
surveyed the terrain from the heights of Pratzen.  Ségur recalls that the emperor 
remarked, “Master of this good position [the Pratzen Plateau] …I could stop the Russians 
there; but then I would have nothing but an ordinary battle, whereas, by abandoning it to 
them and retiring my right, if they dare to descend from those heights to envelop me, they 
would be lost without recourse.”51  The Pratzen Heights offered an enticing strategic 
position.  Although Napoleon’s army probably could have defended the heights with 
ease, Napoleon knew that, by leaving them exposed, the Allies would assume that he did 
not have the strength for battle.  They would be tempted to seize the Heights, then try to 
attack the French right wing or out flank them.  With this in mind, Napoleon decided to 
deploy the majority of his forces west of the Goldbach brook, leaving only Soult’s and 
Murat’s corps as “bait” on his right wing, supported by Davout.  Napoleon planned to 
wait until the enemy had committed to attacking his right wing.  Then he would send in 
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Davout to defend his right while Lannes’ and Bernadotte’s corps attacked the Allied 
army from the rear, with his signature manoeuvre sur les derrières.  The Allied plan of 
attack, developed by General Kutuzov’s Chief of Staff, Franz Ritter von Weyrother, 
proved to be exactly as Napoleon had predicted: “The Allies would cross the Goldbach in 
force south of the French right, turn north to envelop the French, and cut the Brünn-
Vienna road.  A secondary attack would hold the French left in place.”52  Napoleon’s 
exposed right wing proved irresistible to the confident Allies.  Robert Goetz credits much 
to the success of the battle to Napoleon’s personal abilities, explaining that, “his planning 
from the outset was designed to allow reaction to enemy operations based on a range of 
possible situations.  These plans evolved with each report that arrived, and Napoleon 
modified them several times throughout the night before the battle.”53  He had considered 
all of the possibilities of Allied movement, and devised that they would not be able to 
resist the opportunity to attack such a “weak” right wing.   
Napoleon’s planning achieved such decisive results because he formed it based on 
a wealth of information, gleaned through personal reconnaissance.  As was his custom, 
Napoleon spent the days leading up to the battle surveying the terrain around the 
Goldbach and leading reconnaissance missions all along the prospective combat lines.  
He observed the natural defenses of the terrain and determined how he could use them to 
his advantage.  Leaders who do not take the time to reconnoiter a battlefield personally 
cannot possibly produce battle plans that manipulate the natural topographic elements to 
their fullest potential.  Generals must have a thorough knowledge of the height and 
texture of the ground and the location of foliage and waterways in a battlefield, in order 
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to plan for the inevitable complications that they produce.  The Baron de Marbot recalled 
Napoleon’s actions on the day preceding the battle: 
Napoleon left Brünn early in the morning, spent the whole day inspecting 
the positions, and in the evening fixed his head-quarters in rear of the 
French centre, at a point whence the view took in the bivouacs of both 
sides, as well as the ground which was to be their field of battle the next 
day. There was no other building in the place than a poor barn.  The 
Emperors tables and maps were placed there, and he established himself in 
person by an immense fire, surrounded by his numerous staff and his 
guard. 54   
 
Napoleon needed a central location from which he could direct the battle.  As always, he 
prepared meticulously beforehand; “Every day he rides across his chosen battlefield, he 
reviews the Imperial Guard, the grenadiers, Suchet’s division, Nansouty’s cuirassiers and 
the artillery.  He passes through the ranks, opens satchels and ammunition crates and 
engages soldiers and officers.”55  Preparation for the battle depended on Napoleon’s 
attention to detail.  The events of a battle are never exactly what one expects, so one must 
possess a thorough knowledge of one’s resources and surroundings.  If a general knows 
the exact condition of his troops and the terrain, then whatever unknown variables the 
enemy throws at him, he will at least have a strong foundation of information concerning 
his own abilities.  Napoleon’s preparation for the battle was so detailed that General 
Savary remarked that, “he knew his field as well as the neighborhoods of Paris.”56  
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Napoleon’s dedication to his battle preparations allowed him to develop a risky, yet 
effective, plan to trap the Allied army.   
In addition to his meticulous battle preparation, Napoleon produced successful 
results by inspiring his men with passion for their country, their emperor, and their 
mission. The night of December 1, 1805, the eve of the battle of Austerlitz, Napoleon 
rode along his entire defensive line.  The Baron de Marbot described the spontaneous 
eruption of pride and support for the Emperor:  
The troops, seeing a group of horsemen thus lighted come towards 
them, had no difficulty in recognizing the imperial staff, and in an 
instant, as if by enchantment, we could see along the whole line all our 
bivouac fires lighted up by thousands of torches in the hands of the 
soldiers, The cheers with which, in their enthusiasm, they saluted 
Napoleon, were all the more animated for the fact that the morrow was 
the anniversary of his coronation, and the coincidence seemed of good 
omen.57 
 
The morale all along the French line was insurmountable.  The soldiers, even in their 
exhaustion after a day of battle preparation, respected their commander so much that they 
willingly burned their mattress straw to light the path along his rounds.  The powerful 
spectacle struck Jean-Baptiste Barrés as well: “Men followed him with burning torches to 
light his path.  As his inspection was prolonged and extended the number of torches 
increased; soldiers following him shouting ‘Vive l’Empereur.’  These cries of love and 
enthusiasm spread in all directions like an electric fire.”58  This display of wild 
enthusiasm is one of the aspects of the battle of Austerlitz that almost every chronicler 
mentions, such was its impact on the soldiers involved.   
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 In an official proclamation to his army on the eve of the battle, Napoleon offered 
additional words of encouragement and inspiration:  
Soldiers, I will personally direct all of your battalions; I will remain far 
from the line of fire, if, with your customary bravery you cause 
disorder and confusion in the enemy ranks; but, should victory be in 
doubt even for a moment, you will see your Emperor expose himself 
to the first volleys, because victory cannot be hesitant, on this day 
especially when the honor of the French infantry is at stake, which 
matters so much to the honor of the whole nation.59  
 
Napoleon inspired the men to work twice as hard by explaining that he intended to 
remain safely outside the line of fire unless he had any doubt of victory.  They knew that 
as long as they fought their emperor would remain out of harm’s way.  If they failed to do 
so, then they know that their emperor would be ready and willing to risk his life for the 
sake of his country.   
The proclamation illustrates the fine line that a general must walk between 
directional and participatory leadership.  On the one hand, he needs to remain safe so that 
he can continue to command the battle—losing one’s commander in the middle of a 
battle can cause tremendous delays and confusion that can prove to be fatal.  On the other 
hand, a commander must do everything in his power to ensure that his army can function 
and fight properly—if the soldiers’ morale is low, a commander can take a more personal 
role in the leadership of the battle, risking possible bodily harm.  During the battle, 
Napoleon displayed personal fortitude in precarious situations as a source of inspiration 
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for his men.  Barrès recalled a speech that Napoleon made to his battalion upon reaching 
the Pratzen Heights; Napoleon encouraged them, declaring, “Chasseurs, my Horse 
Guards have just routed the Russian Imperial Guard. Colonels flags, guns, all have been 
taken.  Nothing could resist their intrepid valour.  You will imitate them.”60  Napoleon 
emboldened Barrès battalion to follow in the magnificent wake of the Horse Guards.  He 
posed a challenge to the reserves and by giving them a focused task—that of matching 
the valiant efforts of the Horse Guards—they had less time to become nervous about the 
task which lay ahead.  Napoleon emphasized the positive efforts of the Horse Guards, so 
that the Chasseurs could avoid mass fear which could escalate to panic.  Although 
Napoleon did not expose himself to danger at Austerlitz, he played an active role in the 
battle and maintained high morale from a safe distance, which, given the brilliance of his 
tactical maneuvers and the already high morale of his army, was all that was required of 
him.  He displayed a healthy balance between remaining safe to continue leading the 
battle and, having declared his intention to expose himself to danger, inspiring his men to 
do their duty, with the implication that this would protect their emperor.   
 Napoleon maintained active control over the battle of Austerlitz through his 
choice of the Zuran hill as a command post, after careful personal reconnaissance.  From 
his central position atop the Zuran hill he could see the entire stretch of the battlefield, 
which proved essential to his battle command.  When Marshal Soult appeared anxious to 
send his troops into the fight, “…Napoleon, calmer [than Soult], letting the enemy 
destroy itself, held him back still.  He showed him the Pratzen: ‘How much time do you 
need to reach the top of that summit?—Ten Minutes, responded the marshal.—Go then, 
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resumed the Emperor, but wait another quarter of an hour, and then the time will be 
right!’”61  Napoleon’s calm demeanor in the face of a numerically superior army, displays 
a real fortitude of leadership.  He could easily have panicked and ordered his forces in too 
soon, fearing that he might be overwhelmed if he waited too long, but his plan provided 
that he must wait for the Allies to fully commit themselves to his trap before his troops 
could advance.   
 Napoleon personally controlled the deployment of his troops throughout the 
battle. He began by ordering Vandamme’s and St Hilaire’s divisions to advance on the 
enemy, to force them off of the Pratzen Heights, and wedge themselves between the two 
wings of the Allied army.  They deployed rapidly toward the plateau, “observing from his 
command post on the Zuran Hill, Napoleon had suddenly lost sight of Vandamme’s men 
as they surged over the crest of the heights…”  After giving orders to many different 
troops, “…Napoleon and his staff and escort rode ahead of them to establish a new 
command post on the Stare Vinohrady from which point the entire Pratzen Heights would 
be visible.”62  In changing his command post to a location more suitable for managing his 
army on top of the Pratzen Heights, Napoleon demonstrated his will to actively construct 
the outcome of the battle.  If he had remained on top of Zuran Hill once his army had 
already fought up to the Pratzen, then he would not have been able to make as informed 
decisions about his troop movements and the necessary employment of his reserves.  
Following the French victory on the Pratzen Heights, Grand Duke Constantine’s Russian 
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Guard cavalry surprised several battalions of Vandamme’s infantry, in one of the lower 
areas of the terrain, invisible from Napoleon’s command post on Stare Vinohrady.  Ségur 
remarked that, “…the combat, in the lower-lying fields, was hidden from him.  The sound 
became so menacing, that, turning his eyes away from the decisive attack in front of him, 
and seeing a black mass of troops in motion behind him, he exclaimed, ‘What! Are those 
the Russians there?’”63  Even from his new vantage point on the edge of the Pratzen was 
difficult for Napoleon to see everything at once.  However, he took precautions to avoid 
being caught unaware.  He sent Ségur to verify that the column was French, and not 
Russian.  Napoleon acknowledged the possibility that the small Allied victory of the 
Russian Guard cavalry could escalate into a larger problem, requiring a reevaluation of 
his plans, and ensured that such an event would not take place if he could prevent it.  
 Facing the unanticipated threat of the Russian Imperial Guard cavalry, Napoleon 
recognized the need for immediate reinforcements; Ségur wrote, “Napoleon, whose 
headquarters were in the center of the fighting, foiled an attempted cavalry maneuver by 
the Russian Imperial Guard by sending in the dependable Rapp with a couple of 
squadrons of chasseurs of the French Imperial Guard, as well as the Mamelukes, crushing 
the élite Russian cavalry.”64  Napoleon’s close proximity to the battle allowed him to 
deploy the necessary reserves quickly and effectively.  After the Russian Guard cavalry 
broke and scattered the quatrième ligne of Vandamme’s division, Napoleon wryly 
declared to Rapp, the leader of his own Imperial Guard cavalry, “There is a mess there.  It 
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needs to be fixed.”65  While it is important for a commander to strengthen weak positions 
in his line with fresh reserves, one also must be prudent in the allocation of these 
reserves.  In his memoirs, Gouvion St Cyr remarked that Napoleon, “when the first corps 
had become engaged, allowed them to calmly fight on, without troubling himself about 
their good or bad positions, and only took good care not to yield too lightly to any 
requests for support on the part of their leaders.”66  In contrast to his actions at Austerlitz, 
Napoleon encountered this problem of expending too many reserves too early in a battle, 
later at Waterloo.  
 Ultimately, Napoleon’s active command over the battle allowed him to modify his 
original plans in order to benefit from every possible Allied weakness and to accurately 
counteract their offensive maneuvers.  Despite the undisputedly decisive results of the 
battle, the Allied soldiers made a valiant effort.  While the Allied army suffered many 
disadvantages, faulty leadership—Tsar Alexander having never fought a battle before—
damaged morale after the Allied surrender at Ulm, and misconstrued reliance on 
preconceived notions of how the French army would react, these factors combined with 
the well-laid trap that Napoleon set for them produced disastrous effects.  Despite all of 
their upper level structural and command problems, the Allied soldiers themselves fought 
well.  Recalling the battle from St Helena in January 1816, Napoleon remarked that, “The 
Russians shewed themselves on that occasion [Austerlitz] such excellent troops as they 
have never appeared since; the Russian army of Austerlitz would not have lost the battle 
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of the Moscowa [Borodino].”67  The overwhelming difference in the quality of leadership 
of the French and Allied armies was a deciding factor in the outcome of the battle.  
Robert Goetz explains that, “in sharp contrast to the allied army, which suffered serious 
problems with command cohesion from the outset, Napoleon remained in contact with 
his subordinate commanders throughout the battle, maintaining a firm central control and 
issuing clear, concise mission-oriented directives.”68  Solid communication from the top 
down facilitates to the smooth and efficient functioning of an army. 
 After the Allied army began to retreat back over the frozen lakes to the south of 
the Goldbach brook, Napoleon ordered his Imperial Guard artillery to fire on the ice, to 
prevent their escape and ensure his absolute victory.  The Baron de Marbot describes the 
horrifying scene; “[the ice] broke at countless points, and a mighty cracking was heard.  
The water, oozing through the fissures, soon covered the floes, and we saw thousands of 
Russians, with their horses, guns, and wagons, slowly settle into the depths.  It was a 
horribly majestic spectacle which I shall never forget.”69  At Austerlitz, Napoleon 
achieved a brilliant strategic and tactical victory, rendering the Allied army unable to 
continue fighting.  At the end of the battle the Allies had suffered 11,000 Russian 
casualties and 4,000 Austrian casualties.  They had lost 12,000 prisoners, 180 guns, and 
45-50 colors and standards.  It only cost the French 2,000 dead, 7,000 wounded, and 573 
captured.70  A victory of such staggering proportions, particularly given how severely 
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outnumbered Napoleon had been at the beginning of the battle, pays tribute to his 
abilities as a battlefield commander.   
 At Austerlitz, Napoleon achieved the decisive victory that he had so desperately 
needed.  He ended the war against the Third Coalition in only a matter of weeks.  His 
confidence in his own tactical abilities, active involvement in the battle, and adaptive 
thinking, allowed him to take advantage of every opportunity that presented itself.  
Following the attack of the Russian Guard, a Russian soldier was taken prisoner.  Ségur 
recalls his interview with Napoleon during the battle: 
“In this moment…[a] young artillery officer that our chasseurs had 
taken prisoner, was brought before the Emperor, he struggled, he cried, 
he wrung his hands in despair, crying, ‘That he had lost his battery! 
That he was dishonored! That he would like to die!’  Napoleon, 
consoling him, said to him: ‘Calm yourself, young man, and know that 
there is never shame in being defeated by the French!’”71  
 
On that day in particular, Napoleon was right.  The French army functioned as a well-
oiled machine, under the vigilant gaze of its remarkable commander.   
 
Wellington: The Battle of  Salamanca, July 22, 1812 
At the battle of Salamanca, Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington, reaffirmed his 
reputation as an impeccable battlefield commander.72  The four French armies occupying 
the Iberian Peninsula73, outnumbered Wellington’s allied forces, approximately 230,000 
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to 70,000.74  Despite their superior numbers, the French armies struggled to survive in 
Spain, facing the ever growing threat of starvation as a result of Wellington’s scorched 
earth policy and fierce opposition from the Spanish people—who organized themselves 
into partisan resistance forces, fighting the guerrilla, or little war, using atypical tactics to 
resist the French intruders. 75  Sometimes referred to as the “Spanish ulcer,” the 
Peninsular War (1807-1814) exerted a constant drain on French resources.  Wellington, 
charged with the task of expelling the French from Spain, would have to provoke battle 
before the French had the opportunity to unite against him.  Wellington needed to decide 
which army to fight first.  Michael Glover explained that if Wellington defeated Marmont 
“Soult [and the Armée du Midi] would have to evacuate Andalusia or be isolated, 
Wellington decided to strike at the Armée d[u] Portugal.  Having left 18,000 men to 
watch Soult from around Badajoz, he could put into the field a force of 48,000 men, 
including 17,000 Portuguese and 3,000 Spaniards.”76  However, when the two armies 
encountered one another around the river Duero, neither commander wanted to attack 
first.  The two armies spent the three weeks prior to the battle marching and 
countermarching, each endeavoring to provoke the other to combat.  Finally, on July 22, 
Marmont decided to attack—having seen the British baggage train moving to the rear and 
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thinking Wellington was retreating, leaving only a strong rearguard.  The battle of 
Salamanca proved a true test of Wellington’s personal vigilance and self-control, 
requiring him to wait until the opportune moment to attack or fall back.   
Wellington always sought the most accurate information available before 
committing his army to a fight.  Habitually, he did his own reconnaissance and produced 
his own maps.  He had teams of intelligence officers and engineers, as well as the 
Spanish partisans, who enthusiastically passed French intelligence information to the 
British.  Wellington’s intelligence system researched many aspects of the enemy army 
that other generals might consider unnecessary; for instance, “he instead on learning 
every detail of the location and strength of the regiments of the French, even the names of 
their commanding officers…he not only knew in good time when they had altered their 
dispositions, he was in a position to guess reasonably accurately what the changes might 
signify.”77  In a letter that Wellington wrote to Lord Bathurst on July 21, he revealed that 
his informants had determined that 10,000 to 12,000 troops from the Armée du Nord 
would march to Marmont’s aid and that these reinforcements were supposed to arrive 
within a few days.78  Wellington knew that he would have to either give battle, or retreat 
northward, abandoning Salamanca to the French.  The battlefield—immediately south of 
the city of Salamanca—consists of gentle rolling slopes, ideally suited for troop 
movements; two isolated plateaus, the Greater and Lesser Arapiles, situated about 900 
yards apart from one another mark two of the few exceptions to the generally level 
terrain.  To the west of the two plateaus lies the village of Los Arapiles. To the north 
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stands another hill, Teso de San Miguel.  South of Los Arapiles is a long stretch of high 
ground called the Monte de Azan.79  Despite the very minor slopes of the generally flat 
battlefield Wellington managed to use the ground to his advantage.  Glover states that, 
“alone among his contemporaries, [Wellington] took care always to take advantage of the 
ground to shield the tenuous line from enemy artillery and skirmishers until the last 
possible moment.”80  Wellington planned meticulously for battle in preparation for the 
unexpected maneuvers that the enemy would use in an attempt to fluster him. 
Wellington displayed his tactical genius through a calculated control over the 
battle of Salamanca.  Peter Young and J.P. Lawford state that a commander’s strategic 
aim, “is to bring his adversary to battle when his adversary has inferior forces and is in a 
disadvantageous position.  Since a competent enemy commander, by definition, will not 
accept battle at a disadvantage, to achieve this aim it is normally necessary to surprise 
him in a position from which retreat is militarily or politically difficult.”81  In the few 
weeks leading up to the battle, both Wellington and Marmont, being competent 
commanders, avoided offensive maneuvering, recognizing its disadvantage with their 
nearly equal numbers.  Wellington justified his decision to await a French attack:  
Between the 20th and the 22nd, I had a favorable opportunity of 
attacking the enemy, of which, however, I did not think it proper to 
avail myself for the following reasons.  First, …in the position which 
we occupied, I considered it advantageous to be attacked....Secondly; 
the operations against the forts at Salamanca took up the attention of 
some of our troops; and [our] superiority was not so great as to 
render an action decisive of the result of the campaign, in which we 
should sustain a great loss…82 
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Throughout his military career, Wellington maintained a reputation for being a cautious 
commander, preferring to allow the enemy to attack first, in order to fight a defensive 
battle in which he could use the terrain to its fullest advantage.  Marmont knew this and, 
as a result, determined to attack what he thought was Wellington’s strong rear guard—in 
reality the bulk of Wellington’s forces in the Peninsula—never dreaming that Wellington 
would attack him.  Such was Marmont’s confidence of success on the eve of battle, he 
sent instructions to his old landlord in Salamanca to have a celebratory meal prepared for 
him.   
 On July 22, south of where the city of Salamanca lies on Rio Tormes, the fighting 
began between French and British skirmishers around 6 a.m.  By 8 a.m., the French army 
had occupied the Greater Arapile, just south of the Lesser Arapile, upon which 
Wellington had stationed his troops.  He deployed his forces in an L-shape, extending to 
the north and west of the Lesser Arapile.  He had wanted to use the Greater Arapile as an 
advanced post, but the French had occupied it, before he was able to perceive its true 
value to his defensive position, as it had appeared deceptively far away from atop the 
Lesser Arapile.  The French deployed in a similar L-shape to the south and east of the 
Allies.  Although he realized that he would likely be forced to retreat, leaving Salamanca 
to Marmont, Wellington delayed the order to retreat with the hope that an opportunity 
would arise of which he might take advantage.  He concentrated on strengthening the 
area around the village of Arapiles as well as farther west, near the Zurguen River; this 
way he could ensure that if he did need to retreat, he would be able to protect his troops. 
Marmont split his army into two wings: he deployed the right wing, led by 
General Foy, around Calvarrasa de Arriba, east of the Lesser Arapile, and the left wing he 
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placed to the south of the Greater Arapile, under the command of General Bonnet.83  
Between 11:00 and 11:30 a.m., from his position on top of the Lesser Arapile, Wellington 
could only see a single division holding the summit of the Greater Arapile.  In hopes of 
being able to take the hill, Wellington ordered the First Division to attack, however, once 
he saw the strong force concentrated behind the Greater Arapile, he was forced to call off 
his offensive.  Rory Muir claims that the revoked attack, “ reflected [Wellington’s] 
frustration at the thought of abandoning Salamanca without a fight, but when Beresford 
showed that the French behind the Greater Arapile were stronger than Wellington had 
realized, and hence the attack would involve more risk, he cancelled it rather than 
jeopardize the safety of the army.”84  Wellington chose the prudent option.  Some 
generals make a decision and then become so committed to said action in their minds, 
that they become blind to all other options.  In the event that the conditions that made an 
action advantageous in the first place cease to exist, a weak commander might be inclined 
to continue with a plan regardless, due to his preconceived notion of its value, even if the 
new information revealed that the plan could ultimately harm his overall mission.  
Wellington was infamous for his calculated battlefield maneuvers, only choosing a course 
of action after weighing its advantages and disadvantages, and never allowing 
preconceived notions to cloud his judgment.  
 After aborting his attack on the Greater Arapile before it began, Wellington took 
possession of the village of Arapiles and strengthened his right wing, in the likelihood 
that retreat would be its only option.  Marmont, seeing these movements, assumed that 
Wellington intended to withdraw toward the river Zurguen.  In response to these 
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assumptions, he ordered his left wing to extend itself westward.  Maucune and 
Thomière’s divisions moved in the direction of the Monte de Azan, which formed the 
southern border of the L-shaped Allied position.  Given that Wellington was known for 
his preference of defensive battles and that he was strengthening the area that would be 
his route of retreat, the last thing in the world that Marmont expected was an Allied 
attack.  Unfortunately, Wellington saw an opportunity to go on the offensive and did just 
that.  The French left had overextended itself, and Wellington seized the opportunity to 
attack.  Around 3:00p.m., he ordered Pakenham’s Third Division along with Alten and 
D’Urban’s cavalry—the equivalent of four infantry divisions and four cavalry brigades—
against two French infantry divisions and two weak cavalry brigades.85  As Pakenham’s 
division attacked the French left, a British artillery shell wounded Marmont, rendering 
him unserviceable for the remainder of the battle; unluckily for the French, General 
Bonnet, his second in command, was also hit within minutes of taking over.  It took a few 
minutes for Clausel, the third in command, to be notified in order to take command, and 
for those few minutes, the French army fought on, without a leader.  On the British right, 
Pakenham’s Third Division opposed Thomière’s division and pushed it up the heights of 
Monte de Azan.  At the end of this attack, both Marcune’s and Thomière’s divisions had 
been shattered.  Pack’s Portuguese battalion of the Fourth Division, fighting against 
Bonnet’s division atop the Greater Arapile, temporarily lost order and fled, but managed 
to regroup and attack again, with the support of the Sixth Division. While it would have 
been advantageous for the French to retreat around 6:00p.m., Clausel decided to gamble 
everything in order to secure a French victory—instead of withdrawing, he ordered a 
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counterattack.  This counterattack met with the full force of the British 4th, 5th and 6th 
divisions; Clausel advanced to a point, but his left wing got caught in the crossfire of the 
Allies firing from the Lesser Arapile and Teso San Miguel.  Bonnet’s troops fled, 
exposing Clausel’s flank, to its utter ruin.   
 Wellington’s pursuit of the French would have been more complete, if not for two 
factors.  First, Carlos de España had abandoned his position on the British left, the castle 
at Alba de Tormes, without asking for permission or even letting him know that the 
defense there was gone.  Therefore, Wellington sent the Light Division after the French, 
north-east in the direction of Huerta, assuming that they would not have been able to pass 
by Alba de Tormes, because he presumed that España still held it.  This allowed the 
French an advantage in their escape.  Second, although he clearly won the battle, 
Wellington did not try to pursue the French violently.  First and foremost, he needed to 
look out for the best interests of his army.  Michael Glover asserts that, “A full-scale 
pursuit with his exhausted men and horses would have cost him heavy losses and he 
could not afford to risk his army against the Army of the North with such remnants as 
might be battle-worthy of Marmont’s force.  Nor could he leave his communications 
open to the Armies of the Centre and the South.”86  Wellington had surprised his enemy; 
the master of defensive battle had gone against his normal inclinations and attacked the 
exposed French position.  Young and Lawford praise Wellington’s tactical efforts during 
the battle of Salamanca, explaining that, from the beginning, he ensured that, “he could 
not be surprised, while by his own dispositions he ensured that his own movements 
would be largely concealed.  He avoided that besetting sin of commanders in defense, 
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trying to hold too much ground.  At no time was more than a third of his army tied to 
defending specific features.”87  Wellington did not try to overextend his army but rather 
he matched his orders to his army’s capabilities. 
 Wellington’s tactical genius lay in the malleability of his plans.  He tended to 
react to enemy action, rather than focus on a set of predetermined objectives.  In this 
manner he could wait until an opportunity presented itself, at which point he would 
pursue whatever action would ensure the greatest British gain.  He fought a deliberate, 
methodical battle.  Around midday, a force of 10,000 French troops appeared to be 
collecting to attack General Leith’s Fifth Division, which was deployed north of the 
Lesser Arapile.  Sir Andrew Leith Hay wrote: 
When he arrived at the ground of the 5th division, now under arms, and 
perfectly prepared to receive the attack, his Lordship found the enemy in 
the same formation as when he first appeared opposite, but not displaying 
any intention of trying his fortune by crossing the ravine at that point.  The 
commander of the forces soon became satisfied that no operation of 
consequence was intended against this part of the line; and he again 
galloped towards the right, which at that time had become the most 
interesting and important scene of action.88 
 
 This small test of enemy intentions allowed Wellington to use reserves to strengthen 
other areas of his line where the attack might actually occur, instead of wasting them on 
an area which was unlikely to be attacked.  When Marmont overextended his left wing, 
Wellington was able to exploit this information to his advantage:   
Once Wellington decided to attack, his plan was simple, but only because 
his troops were already in position.  Another general might have 
committed the army to retreat hours earlier, or been so mentally 
committed himself that he would have seen in Thomières’s move only a 
threat to his lines of communication, not an opportunity to attack.  But 
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Wellington had his army completely in hand, ready for whatever course he 
might need to take: whether to resist a direct French attack, or withdraw in 
the evening, or suddenly assume the offensive.89 
 
Wellington’s flexibility of action was a major deciding factor in the victory of 
Salamanca.  Choosing the last course of action that Clausel would have expected, enabled 
Wellington to turn a reluctant, embarrassing withdrawal into an overwhelming victory.   
 Wellington’s ability to plan according to French movements relied on his active 
involvement in the battle and overall awareness of the events as they took place.  The 
information he gathered before the battle contributed to this, however, his dedication to 
personally ordering each of his troops movements increased efficiency and reduced the 
possibility of confusion or error.  When he had decided to attack the French at the Greater 
Arapile around 11:00a.m., he did so quickly and efficiently.  Henry Campbell, 
commander of the First Division, explains that Wellington, “told me to move forward in 
two Columns up a Hill in front of our Right, where this Division then was, and attack 
their left, while the 4th Division was to attack them in front, but I had hardly put the 
Columns in motion, before I received a Counter Order and moved back to the Ground I 
had before quitted.”90  The speed with which Wellington relayed both the order to attack 
and its revocation exhibit how personally involved he was in the battle.  Without such 
efficient lines of communication, the First Division might have attacked regardless, 
ignorant of the superior number of French troops hidden by the slope of the Greater 
Arapile.  Wellington did not allow his divisional commanders to persuade him to attack 
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prematurely.  Private Wheeler recalls that Wellington waited patiently to send his troops 
forward, avoiding expending forces unnecessarily before they would be most effective: 
Lord Wellington rode up to use, and entered into conversation with 
Colonel Mitchell.  He waited some time anxiously looking towards the 
hill, as the enemy’s fire was very brisk.  Colonel M—said to Lord W—
that he should like to advance and drive them from the hill, but his 
Lordship looked as serious as a Judge going to pass sentence of death, 
shook his head and said it is not time yet.  At length he called out ‘7th. 
Division, Advance’; spurred his horse, rode to our left and in a few 
minutes was lost in dust and smoke.91 
 
Wellington displayed a level of control over the battle of Salamanca unrivaled by all 
except perhaps Napoleon himself.  In a letter dated July 27, 1812, an unidentified British 
officer wrote that, “the great novelty of the day was the keeping of the troops so well in 
hand, and stopping their headlong impetuosity after each succeeding attack—The 3 
divisions wheel’d round as a single company would, & the long lines were preserved 
most beautifully—…”92  Such a level of control over troops is remarkable, given the 
undeniable possibility of panic and overzealous pursuit beyond the point of constructive 
fighting.93  Wellington’s personal command of his troop movements allowed him to 
remain in control of the battle as a whole, responding to enemy actions in an efficient 
manner.  
 Wellington can be regarded as a cautious commander; he always maintained a 
supply of reserves and a viable escape route, in the event that he was forced to retire.  
While Leith’s Fifth Division moved left to attack Maucune’s French division deployed on 
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the heights of Monte de Azan to oppose, Wellington deployed the Seventh Division to 
occupy the position that the Fifth division had vacated in order to ensure that he had 
reserves available in case the troops on Monte de Azan proved to be stronger than he had 
thought.94  In contrast to Wellington’s effective deployment of reserves, Marmont did not 
consider the possibility of a British attack on his left.  Sir Thomas Picton states that, 
“Marmont, by extending his left, was in hopes of being enabled to turn the right of the 
allies; but as this was done without a corresponding movement of the remainder of the 
French army, but by the extension of the line, it was a necessary consequence that the 
whole was comparatively weakened.”95  This fatal mistake on Marmont’s part proved to 
be his undoing. Wellington broke the French left with a concentrated force, reinforced 
with reserves ready to follow their comrades to crush the weakened French left.  
Wellington kept a strong reserve force in order to be able to strike at the opportune 
moment.  Napier described that,  
The crisis of the battle had now arrived, and the victory was for the 
general who had the strongest reserves in hand.  Wellington, who was seen 
that day at every point of the field exactly when his presence was most 
required, immediately brought up from the second line the sixth division, 
and its charge was rough, strong, and successful.96 
 
Wellington’s close watch over his army allowed him to move in reserves to add enough 
pressure to finish his successful attack.  
 In addition to his overall effectiveness as a tactical battlefield commander, 
Wellington served as a constant source of inspiration for his troops.  His calm, collected 
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demeanor instilled confidence in his soldiers, giving them the will to fight well to please 
their commander and uphold the honor of their unit and their country.  William Grattan, 
remarks that, on the day of the battle,  
…every eye was turned towards him [Wellington].  He looked paler than 
usual, but notwithstanding the sudden change he had just made in the 
disposition of his army, he was quite unruffled in his manner, and as calm 
as if the battle about to be fought was nothing more than an ordinary 
assemblage of the troops for a field-day.  His words were few and his 
orders brief…97   
 
Wellington always displayed an unparalleled confidence in his actions and decisions.  
While never taking the decisions of war lightly, Wellington never allowed himself to 
appear concerned about a battle.  His self-assurance commanded respect from all who 
served or opposed him.  While visiting the battlefield in October of 1812, William Morris 
recounts:  
I was told an Anecdote of Lord Wellington that during the engagement as 
he passed by his wounded men he exclaimed [“]now do my brave fellows 
those that can hold up your heads & see what a precious beating we are 
giving them[.”] this I had from [a] Soldier who was wounded in the battle, 
his [Lord]ship is spoke of by the Soldier in Terms of the greates[t] 
admiration for his ability as a commander and cool determined bravery.98  
 
After offering their lives and limbs to the British Army, Wellington wanted his soldiers to 
know that they did not fight in vain.  He offered hope and encouragement, even to the 
wounded, who would not be able to serve him further in the present conflict.  Wellington 
embraced both the tactical and human aspects of a leader; Rory Muir attests that, 
“throughout the battle he was almost invariably at the vital point, personally giving his 
subordinates clear, concise orders which left no room for misunderstanding.  Every 
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Anglo-Portuguese division saw him in turn during the battle, and his presence and 
alertness strengthened the confidence of the troops.”99  A commander who embodies a 
strong presence on a battlefield will spread self-assurance to his troops; if the soldiers see 
him actively involved in the battle, they feel more secure; they can believe that their 
commander would only send them in to fight for a specific strategic objective, with a 
reasonably strong assurance that they would survive the ordeal.   
 Compared with the French army, suffering from constant supply shortages, 
Wellington supplied his army well and maintained high morale.  After three weeks of 
marching and countermarching, Wellington’s army was itching to prove itself.  Captain 
John Kincaid of the Light Division exclaimed that: 
There was assuredly never an army so anxious as ours was to be 
brought into action on this occasion.  They were a magnificent body of 
well-tried soldiers, highly equipped and in the highest health and 
spirits, with the most devoted confidence in their leader and an 
invincible confidence in themselves.  The retreat of the four preceding 
days had annoyed us beyond measure, for we believed that we were 
nearly equal to the enemy in point of numbers and the idea of retiring 
before an equal number of any troops in the world was not to be 
endured with common patience.100 
 
Such morale is invaluable in the successful fighting of a battle.  The soldiers’ will to fight 
propels them forward in battle, producing a more effective fighting force overall.  Some 
of the reserve soldiers who saw less action in the battle were disappointed that they did 
not have more of a chance to prove themselves against the French.  Edward Costello 
remarks that, “When the ‘glad sounds of victory’ reached us, a general feeling of pleasure 
pervaded in our ranks, mixed perhaps with come regret that we had not take a more 
active share in the battle.  But all we could do we did, which was to pepper the French 
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well in their hurried retreat from the field.”101  Wellington’s abilities as a commander 
greatly influenced the high morale of his army, to the point that soldiers were 
disappointed to be assigned as reserve troops, despite possible death or mangling.  
 Throughout the course of the battle Wellington constantly exposed himself to 
enemy fire.  He took the risk willingly, as one of the implied dangers of performing his 
duty to its fullest capacity.  In a letter from July 23, 1812, Edward Pakenham wrote, “Our 
chief was everywhere and sadly exposed himself;—in his preservation our little prayers 
were heard most surely.”102  Luckily Wellington managed to avoid the enemy bullets 
until the end of the battle.  During the Light Division’s pursuit of Foy’s division as it 
retreated, Napier recounts that,  
After dusk the Duke rode up alone behind my regiment and I joined him; 
he was giving some orders when a ball passed through his left holster and 
struck his thigh.  He put his hand to the place and his countenance 
changed for an instant, but only for an instant; and to my eager inquiry if 
he was hurt, he replied, sharply, ‘No’ and went on with his orders.103 
 
This incident reflects Wellington’s general attitude towards battle.  He never exposed his 
men to enemy fire while he sat back, allowing a battle to continue without him.  His 
attentiveness in the field came at a price, which he was willing to risk for the brilliant 
execution of the battle.  He was often criticized for exposing himself too much to enemy 
fire, but miraculously he always emerged unscathed.  
 At battle of Salamanca, Wellington proved his skill as a battlefield commander of 
the highest caliber.  At the end of the battle, his Allied army had lost about 5,000 men, 
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while the French army lost approximately 14,000 men and 20 guns.104  Although 
Wellington had successfully driven off Marmont’s Armée du Portugal, he still had three 
other armies in the Iberian Peninsula with which to contend—a force outnumbering his 
army 230,000 to 70,000; however, in fighting at Salamanca, Wellington had pushed the 
line of battle from the Portuguese borders into the heart of Spain.105  As a result of 
Wellington’s small army, the Emperor himself overlooked the significance of this British 
victory; “Napoleon…underestimated the effect of this unexpected defeat on his own 
troops.  Already they detested service in Spain; after July 1812 they came to believe that 
they would be beaten by Wellington wherever and whenever he brought them to 
battle.”106  As was his usual custom, Wellington took his victory in stride.  Lieutenant-
General Napier remarks that,  
I saw him [Wellington] late in the evening of that great day, when the 
advancing flashes of cannon and musketry stretching as far as the eye 
could command showed in the darkness how well the field was won; 
he was alone, the flush of victory was on his brow, and eyes were 
eager and watchful, but his voice was calm and even gentle.  More 
than the rival of Marlborough, since he had defeated greater generals 
than Marlborough ever encountered, with a prescient pride he seemed 
only to accept this glory as an earnest of greater things.107 
 
Wellington’s confidence, tactical skill, and battlefield leadership produced a singular, 
unexpected victory.  The traditionally defensive commander outwitted the overconfident 
Marshal Marmont, to the utter ruin of his army.  Wellington engineered his victory at 
Salamanca with patience, strategy, and poise.  
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 At the battles of Austerlitz and Salamanca, as well as many other battles 
throughout their earlier careers, Napoleon and Wellington displayed their irrefutable 
talents as battlefield commanders.  While each led his army effectively and efficiently, 
their methods of execution differed slightly.  In these two battles in particular, Wellington 
employed a more reactionary leadership style, focusing his movements in response to the 
actions of the enemy, while Napoleon actively engineered his victory, laying a trap for 
his enemy to fall into.  These two victories each were undeniably complete; both 
Napoleon and Wellington had to fight craftily to compensate for their disadvantages at 
the beginning of the battles.  Having examined the active interest and thought that 
Napoleon and Wellington put into the battles of Austerlitz and Salamanca, it will be 
easier to elucidate their similarities and differences in leadership at the battle of Waterloo, 
placing the two leaders in comparison with one another as well as with their own earlier 
battlefield command styles.    
 
The Battle of Waterloo, June 18, 1815 
Following Napoleon’s escape from the Island of Elba in the spring of 1815, the 
European powers feared that he would attempt to take over Europe, again.  They formed 
a coalition to oppose Napoleon’s French army—The Seventh Coalition consisted of 
Great Britain and the Netherlands, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, although the Allied 
Anglo-Dutch army and the Prussian army were the only ones near enough to Brussels to 
play a part in the combat.  In order to fully appreciate the roles of Napoleon and 
Wellington as battlefield commanders on June 18, it is first necessary to describe the 
events of the battle.  
53 
On June 16, 1815, two days before the battle of Waterloo, Napoleon’s army 
fought the Prussians at the village of Ligny.  At the same time, Wellington’s Allied forces 
fought Marshal Ney, commanding Reille’s Second Corps, at Quatre-Bras, the junction of 
the Charleroi-Brussels and Nivelles-Namur roads, a few miles west of the battle of Ligny.  
On that day, Napoleon defeated the Prussian forces, but allowed them to retreat instead of 
immediately pursuing them to ensure a complete victory.  Wellington and the Allies 
claimed victory at Quatre-Bras, but discretely withdrew to a more advantageous position 
on the morning of June 17, evading a costly pursuit.    
The battle of Waterloo began in front of the Mont-Saint-Jean ridge around 
11:30a.m., on Sunday, June 18, after a long, rainy night.108  Napoleon began the battle by 
ordering General Reille’s Second Corps to attack the farm of Hougoumont on the British 
right.  Then, the French infantry of the First Corps, under the command of  Count d’Erlon 
attacked the Allied lines from left to right in echelon as troops from both the First and 
Second Corps attacked the farm of La Haye Sainte, a strong defensive position in front of 
the Allied center.109  During this attack, Napoleon observed the Prussian advanced guard 
on his right, near Plancenoit.  Wellington ordered his cavalry commander, Lord 
Uxbridge, to launch a massive cavalry charge, which crushed most of d’Erlon’s First 
Corps, rendering the survivors at least temporarily ineffective. Unfortunately for the 
Allies, Uxbridge’s heavy cavalry became overzealous in their attack and rode too far into 
French territory.  The French slaughtered many of them, and without the British light 
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cavalry units under Vivian and Vandeleur coming to their rescue, Uxbridge’s 
overenthusiastic cavalry could have been completely destroyed.   
Around 4:30p.m., Marshal Ney ordered a massive French cavalry attack on the 
Allied infantry squares.  Then, around 5:30p.m., the first Prussian troops attacked the 
village of Plancenoit on the French right.  These two events drained the French supply of 
reserves.  Napoleon was forced to send most of his reserves of the Imperial Guard to fight 
the Prussians at Plancenoit, while Ney’s cavalry charges caused many French casualties 
and exhausted the energy of those who survived, without any significant gains. 110  The 
French then launched two final attempts to capture Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte.  
Hougoumont held firm, as it had throughout the day, never once being captured by the 
French. The French increased the pressure on La Haye Sainte and Hougoumont.  While 
the garrison at Hougoumont held firm, the KGL riflemen fighting at La Haye Sainte, 
under Major Baring, defended the farm until they were reluctantly forced to surrender the 
position after expending their last available ammunition.    
Having secured one of the two Allied strongholds, Napoleon organized his troops 
for a final attack; Wellington used the short pause in the fighting to strengthen his 
infantry lines and to reinforce his center by moving in fresh reserves.  Around 7:30p.m., 
Napoleon ordered his Imperial Guard to advance.  As they moved towards the Allied 
infantry for the final attack, they struck fear into the hearts of the younger, inexperienced 
Allied soldiers with their discipline and untarnished reputation for victory.  The infantry 
held firm, however, and after several half-company volleys the infamous Imperial Guard 
broke precedent and began to withdraw.   The retreat of this previously undefeated elite 
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force caused a mass flight all along the French lines.  With the order to advance on the 
Imperial Guard, Wellington eliminated Napoleon’s threat to the sovereignty of the 
nations of Europe. 
The battle of Waterloo was the first instance in which Wellington and Napoleon 
met on the same battlefield.  Their reputations, being the most accomplished army 
commanders of the time, ensured that Waterloo would be a personal battle; each leader 
put his skills to the test against the other. Despite their impeccable reputations, only one 
of them could emerge the victor.   
 
Napoleon: The Battle of Waterloo, June 18, 1815 
 On the morning of June 18, Napoleon’s forces around Mont-Saint-Jean numbered 
around 74,500 men, comprised of 104 infantry battalions and 113.5 cavalry squadrons 
compared to Wellington’s 74,326 men, comprised of 84.5 infantry battalions and 93 
cavalry squadrons.111  The troops faced one another along the Mont-Saint-Jean Ridge.  
During this battle, Napoleon’s leadership style changed dramatically from what it had 
been at the battle of Austerlitz, and throughout his earlier career.  Historians have 
attributed Napoleon’s loss at the battle of Waterloo to tactical problems, 
miscommunication, premature use of reserves, overconfidence, and an underestimation of 
the abilities of the enemy army.  All of these elements, while independently significant to 
the loss of the battle, also point to a certain degree of negligence in Napoleon’s 
leadership.  The Napoleon of Austerlitz would never have let his army operate in such a 
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chaotic and ineffective manner for such a long period of time; one possible explanation 
for this change in Napoleon’s leadership style could be his deteriorating health.  
 Napoleon displayed an overly confident attitude towards the battle from the start.  
This was foolish, considering that Wellington had a reputation for greatness, comparable 
to his own.  At 9:00a.m. Napoleon had breakfast at the farmhouse of Caillou, with his 
marshals and select other officers.  While discussing the forthcoming battle, Napoleon 
remarked that, “Out of one hundred chances, we have ninety-nine for us.”112  Such 
confidence was remarkable, given the unrivaled reputation of his opposing commander.  
General Reille, who had fought against Wellington in Spain, during the Peninsular War, 
gave his opinion that, “Their cavalry is not as worthy as ours; but their infantry is more 
formidable than one would normally think.  Entrenched behind fortifications, it is 
dangerous by its skill of firing accurately; in the open, it remains steady, and if one 
overruns it, it rallies one hundred paces back and returns to the charge.”113  Napoleon 
dismissed this comment, regardless of its merit, stating, “because you have been beaten 
by Wellington, you consider him a great general.  And now I tell you that Wellington is a 
bad general, that the English are bad troops, and that this affair is nothing more serious 
than eating one’s breakfast.”114  His confidence was such that he remarked, “If my orders 
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are executed properly, we will sleep in Brussels this evening.”115  The French troops 
reflected the confidence of their Emperor.  Gustave Comte de Pontécoulant, a French 
artillery colonel, looking over the troops deployed for inspection, remarked: “The Army 
presented, at this moment, a magnificent sight; the enthusiasm and ardor of the soldiers 
were extreme; the hope of finally measuring themselves with the best troops of England 
seemed to enflame their pride again.”116  This splendid display of morale ensured that the 
French could fight to their fullest potential, unencumbered by doubts or pessimism. 
 Historians have debated the degree of Napoleon’s personal reconnaissance of the 
battlefield.  Some sources claim that he rode over the terrain himself, ensuring that he had 
the highest quality of information.117  Others claim that he let his subordinates 
reconnoiter for him, displaying a personal change from the general he had been at 
Austerlitz.118  Regardless of who did the reconnaissance, Napoleon underestimated the 
strength of the Mont-Saint-Jean ridge as a position of defense. He sent General Haxo to 
determine if Wellington constructed fortifications, and he had found none, however, the 
terrain surrounding the ridge provides natural protection with its slopes.  The slope of 
Mont-Saint- Jean is difficult to perceive from the ground, and Napoleon likely did not 
view it as a threat to his armies.  Later, during his exile on Sainte Helena, Napoleon 
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complained of a lack of visibility at Waterloo, perhaps to avoid criticism for not having 
considered the potential threat of the terrain.  Wellington, however, used the slope to his 
great advantage, both for protecting his own troops, stationed on the reverse slope, from 
French artillery fire, and forcing the French infantry and cavalry to expend more energy 
to climb the hill to reduce their effectiveness upon reaching its summit.   
The actual fighting on June 18 did not commence until 11:30a.m. A number of 
factors contributed to this delayed beginning—the inclement weather of the night before, 
the deployment of parts of his forces too far from the battlefield, Napoleon’s 
overconfidence, or perhaps his diminished health.  The rainfall of the previous night had 
left the ground around Mont-Saint-Jean extremely soft. Concerned about the difficulties 
that the soft ground would produce for cavalry and artillery movement, General Drouot 
suggested that the battle be delayed, in order to give the ground time to dry and become 
firmer.119  Waterloo scholars are uncertain whether or not a few hours would have made 
any significant difference in the state of the ground.  However, this could not have been 
the only reason for delay.  Many of Napoleon’s troops had bivouacked quite far from the 
battlefield, and took their time arriving at the Mont-Saint-Jean ridge.  Colonel Trefcon of 
Reille’s Corps described their march from Genappe at 5:00a.m.on the morning of the 
18th: “En route, we received an order from the major-general to stop to wash ourselves 
and eat something.  This news was welcomed with joy, because many of the soldiers 
were dying of hunger and because often, they do not like to fight when they are dirty.  At 
eight o’clock we resumed our march forwards.”120  This account does not imply that the 
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troops deployed farther away were overly concerned about arriving promptly to the 
battlefield.  Judging by his pattern of delays from the previous days of the 1815 
campaign, many scholars blame Napoleon, personally, for the delayed beginning of the 
battle of Waterloo.  The battle of Ligny began late in the day on the 16th, so that by the 
end of the battle, even though the Prussians had been beaten, it was too dark for the 
French to launch the effective, immediate pursuit which would have crushed the Prussian 
army entirely.  Napoleon did not send Marshal Grouchy after the Prussians until the 
morning of the 17th.  A.F. Becke claims that this was due to Napoleon’s extreme state of 
fatigue as a result of his failing health; he retired to bed without giving the order for the 
Prussian pursuit, leaving word for Marshal Grouchy, who had come to head-quarters for 
orders, not to expect them until the morning.121  Napoleon earned serious criticism for the 
delayed Prussian pursuit, because it meant that the Prussians had the opportunity to 
reassemble themselves enough to fight at Waterloo two days later. The pursuit of the 
British on the 17th, after the battle of Quatre-Bras was delayed as well, according to John 
Ropes, “the Emperor yielded to his sense of fatigue.  He put off the execution of the next 
part of his plan.  He moreover neglected to ascertain the facts of the situation, and hence 
was unaware, until too late, of the great opportunity then presented to him.” 122  This 
delay was all the more remarkable, for the French did not begin their pursuit until the 
afternoon.  Lieutenant Martin, of d’Erlon’s Corps, first to be sent towards Quatre-Bras on 
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the 17th remarked that, “having arrived in front of the position, we waited a long time for 
the order to attack, which was finally given to us by Napoleon, himself.  But it was still 
not our turn to prove what we could do, because we found the position vacated…”123  
Napoleon did not pursue the English or the Prussians as vigorously as he might have 
done in his earlier career.  On the 18th, Lieutenant Martin remarked that his corps, still 
thirsty for battle, found itself waiting on Napoleon’s orders yet again: “Thus restored, and 
the weapons cleaned, we waited with impatience for the signal to depart that we imagined 
should be very soon; but, to our great surprise, the hours passed without anyone making 
us change position…”124  Whether the delay of the morning of the 18th occurred as a 
result of the wet terrain or to Napoleon’s overconfidence or personal health problems, it 
cost him dearly later in the day.  Many scholars argue that, had Napoleon been more 
proactive earlier in the day, he might have been able to beat the Allied army before the 
arrival of the Prussians.125  
Napoleon’s mental disposition and personal health have been the subject of much 
scholarly debate over the years.  Some scholars argue that his health should have nothing 
to do with the outcome of the battle of Waterloo.  However, the number of personal 
accounts of drastic changes in his demeanor and engagement in battle is too high to 
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ignore completely.  Napoleon, being the genius behind his army’s operations, needed to 
be in top shape for the campaign.  Unfortunately, both mental determination and health 
failed him in the 1815 campaign.  Alan Schom confirms, “Usually one to sum up a 
military situation quickly and accurately and to act on it with decision and alacrity, 
Napoleon had, during this campaign, been ill during the night, late in rising in the 
morning, and equally lax in making decisions, and…later still in putting them into 
effect.”126  The people surrounding him during the 1815 campaign noted a distinct 
difference in his appearance.  Pétiet wrote that,  
His portliness, his dull white face, his heavy gait, made for quite a 
different general Bonaparte that I had seen, at the beginning of my career, 
during the campaign in year 8 in Italy, in the state of gauntness so 
frightening that there was not a single soldier of his army who failed to 
understand how a body so frail and seemingly so sick could resist so much 
fatigue.127 
 
Napoleon had never been a particularly healthy individual, but in his youth he had been 
able to function with only a few hours of sleep.  His energy, despite his sickly exterior, 
had been unlimited.  In his old age, his poor health finally caught up with him. Even in 
1812, Napoleon suffered from bad digestion, piles, and duodenal-pyloric cancer.128  
These ailments had progressed in the 1815 campaign and hindered his physical abilities.  
Napoleon’s poor health influenced his mental disposition as well.  Marshal Marmont 
remarked that, “…his will was no longer the same, the man was worn down, and the two 
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final campaigns only emphasized this more.  Uplifted with brilliance for a moment, soon 
to fall down again.”129  Napoleon’s overall persona had changed drastically from the 
leader he had been in his earlier career.  The officers who had worked with him on the 
continental campaigns noted a significant difference in his activity and appearance during 
the Campaign of 1815.  
Although his personal health and mobility was not what it once had been, his 
ability to inspire his men had not diminished at all.  Before the battle, he passed one final 
review of his troops; Trefcon described: 
I can never recall that last review without great emotion and I cannot 
better compare the sentiment that I felt then, than to that which I had when 
I crossed the Niémen in 1812. The enthusiasm of the soldiers was great, 
the musicians played, the drummers drummed and a shudder shook all 
these men for whom it was their last day. They cheered the Emperor with 
all their might.130 
 
The men carried this passion and high morale into battle with them.  They fought 
valiantly for their emperor.  Silvain Larreguy de Civrieux remarked that, “Not a wounded 
man abandoned the battlefield, nor a dying soldier rendered his dying breath without a 
thought of devotion to the Emperor.  My captain, pierced by two bullets and losing all his 
blood, had not ceased to rally us with his failing voice, until he fell in the middle of this 
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immortal carnage.”131  That level of devotion to one’s leader is remarkable.  Regardless 
of his failing health and diminished control over the battlefield, Napoleon could still 
inspire his men to greatness.  Jonathon Riley remarked that, “Not for nothing did 
Wellington remark that ‘his presence on the battlefield was worth 40,000 men’; and the 
dreaded cries of ‘Vive l’Empereur!’ which heralded his appearance on many a European 
battlefield came to strike fear into the hearts of his enemies, and courage into the hearts 
of his own men.”132  Unfortunately for Napoleon, inspiration on its own could not win the 
battle; his army needed tangible leadership in order to face the British general. 
 When the battle finally began, Napoleon elected to attack Wellington straight in 
the center, instead of trying to maneuver around him.  However, the French army was 
famously more mobile than the Allied army, which was more cumbersome, so this 
decision contradicted the natural advantages of the French army.  Wellington had 
prepared for battle by strengthening his right wing far more than his left, for two reasons.  
Topographically, the right side would be more vulnerable to an attack, and was closer to 
Brussels, the capital of the French government-in-exile.  In order to protect against 
Napoleon’s famously successful flanking maneuvers, Wellington deployed 17,000 troops 
eight miles to the west of Hougoumont, at Hal.  Wellington had assumed that Napoleon 
would try to maneuver, instead of using such a simple frontal attack, the kind that his 
Allied infantry were best equipped to handle.  When Wellington discovered that 
Napoleon intended to attack his center, he exclaimed, “Damn the fellow, he is a mere 
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pounder after all.”133  Defensive warfare was Wellington’s strength; in attacking in such a 
manner, Napoleon abandoned his tactical advantage in favor of Wellington’s.  
Pontécoulant asserted that, “Napoleon, in wanting to make his victory more brilliant and 
more decisive, made it at the same time more difficult, more murderous, and more 
uncertain.”134  Napoleon’s decision to attack Wellington straight on was indicative of his 
later career—during his last campaigns Napoleon had a tendency to rely on mere 
intimidation and strength of numbers instead of the skillful tactical maneuvers that 
established his earlier career.  John Naylor blames Napoleon’s dual role as a military and 
political leader for the change in his tactical style, claiming that, 
The Marshals were left more and more to their own devices, and lacking 
their master’s genius, they made mistakes which had to be redeemed at the 
cost of fresh losses. Unable to devote himself as he once had to the battles 
on which his power depended, Napoleon came to count on mere numbers 
to compensate for his preoccupation and his subordinate’s 
shortcomings.135 
 
This tendency for Napoleon’s marshals to act independently could have been residual 
from the Peninsular Campaign, which he left for his marshals to fight; he only offered 
advice from abroad while he fought the Austrians, Prussians, and Russians on the 
Continent.  Napoleon’s decision to use a frontal attack reduced the effectiveness of his 
troops, who were best suited for flanking maneuvers.  Wellington had chosen a sturdy, 
defensive position, which he would not relinquish easily. 
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 Napoleon had many problems of miscommunication throughout the Waterloo 
campaign, which caused tactical problems.  The first major one at the battle of Waterloo 
specifically was the attack on the chateau of Hougoumont, on the French left. Napoleon 
had intended this attack to be a simple diversion to direct Wellington’s attention and 
resources away from his center, where he intended to focus his main attack.  
Unfortunately for the French, the attack on Hougoumont continued throughout the day, 
wasting French ammunition and troops as they continually assaulted the chateau, to no 
avail.  This displays negligence of leadership; if Napoleon saw that the attack continued 
even though he had intended it to be a preliminary diversion, then he should have 
immediately sent orders to recall those troops, instead of allowing to continue, 
senselessly wasting their lives and ammunition.  While the grounds surrounding 
Hougoumont changed hands through the day, the French never succeeded in seizing the 
structure from its Allied defenders.  Sergeant Wheeler explained that, “Hougoumont with 
its small garrison of 500, eventually reinforced to 2,000, absorbed the whole effort of 
Reille’s corps of 13,000 throughout the battle.”136  These numbers illustrate the wasteful 
nature of the struggle at Hougoumont—Napoleon’s army fought without gaining any 
ground for their efforts.  Lieutenant Martin, deployed in the center in d’Erlon’s Corps, 
wrote, “While waiting [to attack], a furious combat raged on our left, at the chateau of 
Hougoumont.  We lost many men there, very unnecessarily, they say, because, from the 
onset its sole purpose was to distract the enemy from the real one, reserved for the 1st 
Corps.”137  The fact that Napoleon allowed this attack to continue in such a fierce and 
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fruitless manner implies a degree of carelessness on his part.  It is possible that he could 
not see what was happening at Hougoumont, or that he was preoccupied elsewhere, but 
he seemed to have forgotten about his left side.  He may have been distracted by the 
sudden appearance of the Prussians on his right, but their apparition would suggest that 
he try to conserve as many troops as possible, to ensure that he could keep them at bay, 
instead of wasting them unnecessarily on a fight that continued without results.  
Pontécoulant attests that: 
It is without doubt it was Napoleon’s intention to turn the attention of the 
enemy away from the attack in the center, which was the true core of the 
battle.  However, frustrated to see this episode prolonged for such a long 
time, as much by the energy of the defense as by the false measures 
employed originally to remove this post, and which had already cost us 
many good soldiers, he told General Reille to form a battery of twelve 
howitzers and to set fire to the farm and chateau.138 
 
However, even the burning of Hougoumont was not enough to expel its valiant 
defenders.  Hougoumont did not fall into French possession a single time, throughout the 
entire course of the battle.  Wellington’s troops fought effectively, and the struggle for 
the chateau did not have the effect that Napoleon had originally desired.  The question 
remains, why, when he saw that Hougoumont was becoming a taxing drain of his 
resources, did he not immediately send orders to abandon the attack so that he could use 
those troops more effectively somewhere else?  Whether it was inattention to the events 
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of his battle, or stubbornly attacking Hougoumont despite its drain on his resources, both 
display poor judgment and weak leadership. 
 The infantry attack made by d’Erlon’s Corps between 1:00 and 2:00p.m. and 
Ney’s subsequent series of cavalry assaults against the Allied infantry squares both failed 
due to a lack of varied troop support.139  D’Erlon’s infantry attacks would have been 
much more effective if they had been supported by cavalry; the cavalry would have 
forced the Allied infantry into square formation, which provides an easier target for 
infantry.  The British cavalry attack ended up destroying d’Erlon’s infantry, rendering 
them at least temporarily ineffective, as they tried to reassemble.  Naylor explains that, 
“D’Erlon’s defeat had strengthened the delicate morale of some of the allied troops and 
thousands of French had been sacrificed without gaining a single foothold for the next 
assault.”140  Such a setback so early in the battle did not bode well for the French.  
Napoleon should have supported his infantry with cavalry, and not just artillery fire, from 
which the Allied troops were well protected by their positions on the reverse slope of the 
Mont-Saint-Jean ridge.  A similar problem occurred later, when Marshal Ney launched 
the French cavalry attacks against the Allied infantry squares without the support of the 
French infantry to help them break the massed Allied troops.   
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Following the battle, Napoleon blamed Marshal Ney for the failure of the French 
cavalry attacks, claiming that he had begun the attacks too soon. Margerit defends 
Marshal Ney however, claiming that, “Under a leader occupied exclusively with the 
guard [Imperial Guard], his light cavalry would not have left thus.”141  Particularly given 
the position of Napoleon’s command post at the farm of La Belle-Alliance; he had 
deliberately deployed his reserve troops of the Imperial Guard right behind him. In that 
proximity to Napoleon, Marshal Ney could not have led the cavalry attack without his 
direct order, so if the attack was too early, it could only have been Napoleon’s own fault.  
The Imperial Guard cavalry under Guyot’s command, which was supposed to have 
remained in reserve, followed Kellerman’s cavalry in the charge instead, causing the 
additional problem of committing Napoleon’s cavalry reserve too early in the battle.  
According to Lieutenant Chevalier, “The Emperor perceived and ran after General 
Bertrand to recall them, but there was not time, they were already engaged.”142  This 
happened as a result either of miscommunication between Napoleon and General Guyot 
or blatant insubordination.  Either way, it displays a laxity in leadership, Napoleon not 
having control over his own reserve troops.  This became a problem later in the day, 
when Napoleon could not support his final infantry attacks with anything but a few 
cavalrymen.  The cavalry attacks became an even greater problem because they fought 
without infantry support.  The cavalry enthusiastically charged the Allied infantry 
squares, but throughout the whole day they never succeeded in breaking one.  As a result 
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of d’Erlon’s failed infantry attack, most of Napoleon’s First Corps had been destroyed, 
and Napoleon and Marshal Ney had forgotten about Bachelu’s division and Jamin’s 
brigade of Foy’s division, both fresh troops, which were stationed on the outskirts of the 
Hougoumont woods and which could have provided 6,000 muskets to support Ney’s 
cavalry attacks.143  These troops waited to be sent forward, but never were.  Colonel 
Trefcon complained that, “Our division [Bachelu] and a brigade of General Foy’s 
division found ourselves still in the same position at six o’clock in the evening.  We had 
witnessed the battle hitherto without participating in it.  Some pretended we had been 
forgotten.”144  To overlook such a large and useful force on a battlefield is absurd, 
particularly ones deployed near the frontlines, which had not yet engaged in combat as of 
6:00p.m. Napoleon, understandably needed to retain his battalions of Imperial Guard 
infantry as reserves for his final crushing blow, but to neglect to use regular troops 
stationed near the field of battle which could have greatly aided in the cavalry attacks, is 
inexcusable. 
Napoleon blamed his subordinates for most of the problems that he believed 
caused the French defeat at Waterloo.  In addition to Marshal Ney, he blamed Marshal 
Grouchy, whom he had sent in pursuit of Blücher’s Prussian army the day before the 
battle. Napoleon had ordered him to follow the Prussians and prevent them from uniting 
with the Allied army; he knew that Grouchy intended to pursue them in the direction of 
Wavre.  When he arrived at Waterloo on the evening of the 17th, his reconnaissance 
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should have indicated that the Allies intended to make a stand the following day and give 
battle.  With this knowledge, Napoleon should have immediately recalled Grouchy in 
preparation for battle.  Grouchy’s pursuit of the Prussians had already been delayed—
Napoleon having waited to send them off until the day following the battle of Ligny—so 
Grouchy’s chances of reaching the Prussians before they reached the Allies were not 
good.  Whether or not Marshal Grouchy is to blame for the arrival of the Prussians at 
Waterloo is one of the most highly contested points about the entire battle.   Whatever 
miscommunications occurred on the day of the battle, Marshal Grouchy was not solely to 
blame.   Napoleon did not recall Grouchy, even at dawn on the day of battle, when there 
could have been no question as to whether the battle would occur or not.  Given the large 
head start that the Prussians had, Napoleon would have been better to order Grouchy’s 
30,000 troops to join him at Waterloo, and use them as a strong reserve in the event that 
the Prussians were able to make an appearance.  This would also have saved his Imperial 
Guard troops to be used later, in a stronger final attack.  When he finally decided to send 
for Marshal Grouchy, not even dispatching the order until 11:00a.m. on the morning of 
the battle, he did so in a vague manner, requesting that Grouchy continue to Wavre, but 
keep communications open.  It was not until Napoleon’s second dispatch to Grouchy, 
sent at 1:00p.m., that he actually requested Grouchy join him immediately at Waterloo.145  
In sending these orders, Napoleon underestimated the amount of time they would take to 
reach Grouchy, as well as the amount of time it would take him to reach the battlefield 
following his receiving them; he had thought the orders would reach Grouchy by a fast 
courier at Walhain in one hour, but in reality, the orders Napoleon dictated at 1:00p.m. 
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did not arrive until 7:00p.m.146  Napoleon blames Grouchy for not arriving at Waterloo in 
time for the fight; however, he did not order him to do so until it was too late.  Some 
scholars have argued that Grouchy should have moved toward the sound of the cannons 
at Waterloo as soon as he heard them, however in doing so, he would have been directly 
contradicting his last orders from the Emperor.  As General Thiébault explains: 
The said Gérard bragged to have urged the said Grouchy to take himself to 
the battlefield of Waterloo and accused him of having resisted his advice, 
whereas the Marquis de Grouchy argued on this point, that having 
received from the Emperor the order to follow the Prussian army, and not 
any contrary or different order had reached him, there did not exist any 
human consideration of nature to justify his disobedience or even to render 
it excusable, the Emperor not being one of those leaders whose orders 
could or should be transgressed, commented upon, or modified.147 
 
If Grouchy had not obeyed Napoleon’s orders as well as he could, he would have been 
reprimanded for disobedience.  It is unfair for historians and for Napoleon himself to 
expect Grouchy to comprehend where exactly he was most needed without a direct order.  
It is also uncertain, in the event that Grouchy had decided to move toward the cannon fire 
when he first heard it, whether or not his corps would even have arrived in time to be of 
use.  Napoleon’s anger should have been directed at himself, for having underestimated 
the resilience of the Prussian army, even after their defeat at Ligny on the 16th. 
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 When, around 6:00p.m., the French succeeded in capturing the farm of La Haye 
Sainte, in the center of the British line, Napoleon delayed his final attack, in a fit of 
indecisiveness. 148  This delay which lasted almost an hour, provided ample time for 
Wellington to regroup his army and strengthen its weakened positions with reserves, of 
which he still had ample supply.  Following the fall of La Haye Sainte, Marshal Ney had 
sent a request for more reserves to Napoleon, in order that he might give the final 
crushing blow that would destroy the British center.  Napoleon, nervous about the 
struggle which had begun to develop on the French left at Plancenoit against Bülow’s 
Prussian corps, occupying most of his reserves, did not want to commit the rest of the 
reserves to the fight to early.  However, by delaying the final blow, he allowed 
Wellington to reinforce his center.  Naylor argues that, “If he had been prepared to accept 
this last small raise in the stakes, he must have pierced Wellington’s front and defeated 
his army.”149  Napoleon had changed drastically from the general he had been in his 
earlier career; he was less daring and afraid that because, having relied on brute force 
instead of skillful maneuvering, he could not afford for his final attack to fail.  However, 
this very anxiety caused a delay which allowed the Allied army to strengthen, making the 
success of his attack even more unlikely.  Pontécoulant explains that: 
In other times, more confident in his fortune, he would not have hesitated; 
but misfortune had made him timid; for the first time, perhaps, he lacked 
resolution.  He should have according to a famous demagogue: audacity! 
again audacity! always audacity! He did not listen to anything by 
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prudence, and one could say, truthfully, that if victory was unfaithful to 
him, it is because he, himself, had been unfaithful to his character.150 
 
Napoleon lost his nerve in the end, because the fight against the Prussians on his right 
had left him with only eight battalions of Imperial Guard infantry with which he could 
mount his final attack.  Whether he hoped that Grouchy would appear or whether he was 
just overwhelmed with the events of the battlefield in general, he took his time in 
ordering his final attack, thus granting Wellington the opportunity to regroup. 
Napoleon attributes this delay to the battle against Bülow’s Prussian corps at 
Plancenoit on the French right which held his entire attention.  He had sent in the 
majority of his Imperial Guard reserves to keep the Prussians at bay, leaving only eleven 
battalions in reserve for his final attack.  Although the Prussians at Pancenoit fought 
enthusiastically, the troops of the French Imperial Guard checked their advance, and 
while its possession changed hands frequently, the French continually drove the Prussians 
out of the village.  They displayed an enormous resilience and determination in the face 
of the elite French troops.  Unfortunately for Napoleon, the worst had happened with the 
arrival of the Prussians.  His plan to fight Wellington and Blücher separately had failed.  
He told Labédoyère, one of his aides-de-camp, to spread the word that the troops on the 
horizon were Grouchy’s troops, come to support them, so as to uphold the morale of his 
men.  This tactic worked for a while, however, when eventually, around the time of the 
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final Imperial Guard attack on the allied infantry, the troops discovered that “Grouchy” 
was actually “Blücher,” mass chaos and panic spread all across the French lines. 
Napoleon displayed a limited degree of personal leadership and control over the 
battle.  The miscommunication, the premature employment of reserves, and the 
inefficient attacks on Hougoumont and the British center were all signs of his loose 
control over his army.  During the battle, he established himself on a small hill just 
behind the farm of La Belle Alliance.  He remained in this position from shortly after the 
battle began until the French capture of La Haye Sainte near the very end of the battle.151  
While this position afforded him a reasonable view of the battlefield, the nature of the 
gently rolling terrain made it difficult to fully appreciate the strength of the Allied forces, 
particularly when they were lying down or deployed on the reverse slope of the ridge to 
avoid the French artillery fire.  It also kept Napoleon out of harm’s reach.  Colonel Pétiet 
of Soult’s division remarked on the overall drop in energy displayed by the Emperor in 
the 1815 Campaign.  He remarked that, “When he set foot on the ground, be it to examine 
his maps, or to send or receive information, the men of his staff placed a little white wood 
table in front of him, and a crude seat of the same material, on which he would remain for 
long periods of time.”152  From such a position it would be extremely difficult to see 
everything that was happening on a battlefield.  Andrew Roberts illustrates Napoleon’s 
actions at Waterloo; “Napoleon…ceded operational control to Ney, partly so as to deal 
with the oncoming Prussian threat himself, and kept in one place too much, acting on 
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others’ information rather than riding out to see the situation for himself.”153  This 
secondhand approach to the battle was extremely uncharacteristic of the general of 
Austerlitz.  He had become less mobile and less eager to be in the thick of the fighting.  
General Thiébault was convinced that the loss of Waterloo: 
…was due first of all to Napoleon, who by his additional instructions 
reduced his forces and froze the zeal of many men, and who, not having 
gotten the best out of his troops; having already proven at Quatre-Bras that 
his orders could be violated without punishment, he had to keep the whole 
of his forces under his direct control and, during the night of the 17 to the 
18, infiltrate Grouchy’s corps between the English and Prussian armies.154 
 
Napoleon seems to have lost control over his army.  No one would have ever dared to 
disobey the once vigorous, active general of Austerlitz; however, the slower, ill Emperor 
did not command the same unquestionable authority.  Finally, during his final attack of 
the Imperial Guard, Napoleon became desperate.  In an attempt to rally his troops he 
cried, “Tout le monde en arrière! which suggested that he intended to place himself in 
front.  For a time he did, indeed, march at the head of his troops; but as they reached La 
Haye Sainte he relinquished his place to Marshal Ney and took shelter in the gravel-
pit…”155  Unfortunately Napoleon’s last, desperate attempt to regain control over the 
battle failed.  The Imperial Guard  halted on the slope of the Mont-Saint-Jean ridge, and 
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then all along the line the French troops began to cry, La Garde recule! The Guard is 
retreating!  
 The French retreat was a shambles of men horses and wagons, desperately trying 
to escape with their lives.  The Imperial Guard maintained calm formation and traveled in 
square, retreating with dignity.  On June 18, 1815, the great Napoleon had been defeated 
forever.  His personal contribution to the battle lacked the finesse of his earlier battlefield 
command; instead of being actively involved and fluid, he commanded his troops from 
afar, relying on brute strength rather than skillful maneuver.  Henry Houssaye attests that 
due to the “great number of mistakes perpetrated at Waterloo, Charras, York of 
Wartenbourg, and Marshal Wolseley, have all concluded that the Emperor, broken down 
by misfortune, collapsed under the strain, that he remained inert and blinded far from the 
battlefield, and allowed the contest to proceed without any guidance.”156  Napoleon had 
changed drastically from the general he had been at the battle of Austerlitz, just ten years 
earlier.  A.F. Becke states that Napoleon’s “reckless confidence, coupled with his waning 
powers, induced him to make a fatal miscalculation.  He showed no hesitation in asking 
the utmost from his soldiers, though he failed to give them the assistance they required in 
their desperate fight; assistance, which his former glorious campaigns had taught them to 
expect from him.”157  At Waterloo, Napoleon proved that a commander’s reputation can 
carry him only so far; his personal command of a battle must be impeccable, particularly 
when fighting against one of an equitably astounding reputation.  Unfortunately for 
Napoleon, Wellington had remained consistent in his leadership style, and proved such 
on the 18th of June. 
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Wellington: The Battle of Waterloo, June 18, 1815 
 
 The battle of Waterloo proved to be the ultimate test of Wellington’s abilities as a 
battlefield commander.  Wellington’s hodgepodge Allied army was insufficiently trained, 
particularly compared to his previous Peninsular army or to Napoleon’s veteran troops.  
Wellington’s army had been disbanded after Napoleon’s exile to Elba the year prior; he 
had only 23,990 British troops at Waterloo, along with another 5,800 troops of the King’s 
German Legion, who were equally reliable.158  The remainder of his troops were a 
mixture of Dutch-Belgians and other smaller German nations, whose training and loyalty 
to the Allied cause were infinitely less reliable.  Wellington needed to be as resourceful 
as possible. However, he was, “acutely conscious of the personal nature of the clash 
between himself and France’s greatest commander.”159  The two generals had long been 
compared, but had never had the opportunity to test their skills on the same battlefield.  
The importance of preventing Napoleon from attempting to regain his control over 
continental Europe was great.  The two armies, evenly matched, would reveal once and 
for all, which general had superior battlefield command.   
 Wellington had chosen the position at the Mont-Saint-Jean ridge for its strengths 
as a defensive position; he knew that his army, less mobile than the adeptly maneuverable 
French army, would have a greater chance to prove themselves in defensive battle than 
by attempting to maneuver on the offensive.  Wellington had surveyed the position 
around the Mont-Saint-Jean ridge nearly a year prior, and determined its value in 
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defensive battle in the Netherlands.  In a letter to Lord Bathurst dated September 22, 
1814, he included a memorandum of his reconnaissance in the Netherlands, which said: 
“…about Nivelle, and between that and Binch, there are many advantageous positions; 
and the entrance of the forêt de Soignes, by the high road which leads to Brussels from 
Binch, Charleroi and Namur, would, if worked upon, afford others.”160  The position 
consisted of a long, shallow ridge in the ground, difficult to perceive unless one walks 
over the terrain.  Wellington used this to offer protection for his infantry and cavalry from 
enemy artillery fire by stationing them on the reverse slope.161  Jac Weller explains that, 
“The genius of Wellington’s system of defense was its articulation.  There were no 
earthworks and no positions which could not be temporarily lost…The Duke’s 
infantrymen did not hold any position firmly, save for the buildings at Hougoumont.”162   
This avoided the unnecessary expenditure of forces to maintain a specific position, a 
problem that the French encountered during Joseph Bonaparte’s fruitless struggle to 
capture Hougoumont.  Wellington had a substantial knowledge of the battlefield before 
the battle, and he prepared his troops to fight at daybreak.  Robert Margerit remarks that, 
“Like Napoleon, Wellington had passed his army in review on the positions.  But as of 
nine o’clock in the morning, it was in place and ready to fight.”163  Wellington prepared 
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for battle to ensure that his troops would have every advantage with which to fight the 
French army.  He also ensured that he kept his lines of communication open, to always 
have accurate information within his army as well as with their Prussian allies.  Sergeant-
Major Cotton remarked that, “The duke of Wellington was in constant communication 
throughout the day with the Prussians, by means of general Müffling, who was attached 
to our headquarters’ staff, and by colonel Freemantle, aid-de-camp, colonel Stavely, and 
captain…Basil Jackson of the Royal staff corps…”164  The tactical decisions that 
Wellington made at Waterloo reflected this meticulous preparation.   
 Wellington designed his general orders for the battle to maximize the utility of his 
troops and to preserve ammunition and resources.  During d’Erlon’s infantry attacks 
around 1:30p.m., Wellington tried to ensure that his defensive line would be preserved.  
Rifleman Kincaid, of the 95th Rifle Brigade wrote that, “Lord Wellington had given 
orders that the troops were on no account to leave the position to follow up any 
temporary advantage, so that we now resumed our post…”165  If soldiers became overly 
enthusiastic about pursuing the enemy while it retired, the enemy cavalry could attempt 
to force their way through the Allied lines that they had weakened by leaving their 
positions.  Wellington encountered this problem of overenthusiastic troops immediately 
following d’Erlon’s infantry attack, during Uxbridge’s cavalry attacks. 
Wellington’s reverse slope technique was a revolutionary concept which used the 
slopes of the terrain to the advantage of its defending force; his use of this tactic greatly 
aided his victory at Waterloo.  Wellington’s reverse slope tactics, while uncommon to 
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continental soldiers, proved quite effective against artillery fire.  The basic concept is that 
one deploys one’s soldiers on the slope of the crest farthest from the enemy.  This 
protects the soldiers twofold, because it prevents the enemy artillerymen from aiming 
directly at the infantry, their view impeded by the crest of the ridge, and it also requires 
that any enemy cavalry or infantry sent to attack them must to so uphill, blindly. This 
tires the troops and the cavalry horses and has a terrible effect on morale when, upon 
reaching the summit, the British force is stronger than the enemy had originally foreseen.  
Wellington increased the effectiveness of this reverse slope concept by ordering that, 
when not actually firing on enemy troops, infantry soldiers were to lie down, in order to 
further reduce the range of the artillery trajectories; the troops would then stand up for 
actual combat.  After the battle, Captain Gronow wrote: “I should not forget to state that 
when the enemy’s artillery began to play on us, we had orders to lie down; we could hear 
the shot and shell whistling around us, killing and wounding great numbers; then again 
we were ordered on our knees to receive cavalry.”166  Whether due to Wellington’s 
reverse slope tactics or to French ineffectiveness, A.F. Becke explains that, “In no other 
battle of this era did artillery, so numerically superior, fail to produce a far greater effect 
than the French guns obtained in the battle against Wellington.”167   
 In order to preserve ammunition supplies, Wellington ordered his infantry not to 
fire on single soldiers, but to wait until a large mass of enemy troops presented itself.  
This way, the Allied infantry would not waste an entire volley on a few scattered troops, 
                                                 
166
 R.H. Gronow, The Reminiscences and Recollections of Captain Gronow (New York: 
The Viking Press, 1964), 68. 
167
 Becke, Napoleon and Waterloo, 168. 
81 
but ensure that it only expended ammunition to a useful objective.168  In order to maintain 
pressure on enemy troops during the French cavalry attack in the afternoon, Wellington 
ordered his artillerymen to remain at their guns until the last possible moment, and then 
abandon them to take cover in the infantry squares, deployed behind their batteries, to 
wait until the cavalry had passed by.  This order was extremely effective in that the 
French cavalry continually attempted to capture the Allied cannon, but in pausing to do 
so, they provided an easy target for the Allied riflemen and sharpshooters deployed in 
and around the squares.  
 Wellington artfully responded to problematic situations that arose throughout the 
battle and worked within the limitations of his own resources.  His own army was not in 
the best condition; its multi-national dynamic created many problems of loyalty and 
caused a regional inconsistency in the level of training.  Kincaid remarked that:  
We were, take us all in all, a very bad army.  Our foreign auxiliaries, who 
constituted more than half of our numerical strength, with some 
exceptions, were little better than raw militia- a body without a soul, or 
like an inflated pillow that gives to the touch and resumes its shape again 
when the pressure ceases- not to mention the many who went clear out of 
the field, and were only seen while plundering our baggage in their retreat. 
169
 
 
With such soldiers, Wellington appreciated the necessity of their strategic deployment.  
John Keegan explains that Wellington reinforced the weaker troops with stronger, more 
experienced British or KGL troops; he deployed “most of the Dutch-Belgians into Braine 
l’Alleud at one end of his line and La Haye and Papelotte at the other.  The irreducible 
minimum needed to thicken out his line in the centre he sandwiched between British or 
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German regiments of dependable quality.”170  Working with these imperfectly trained 
troops, who once had loyalties to Napoleon, was difficult, however, ensuring that the 
weaker troops were reinforced on both sides by veteran troops reduced the probability of 
desertion.  Wellington tried to infuse British or German soldiers within the foreign 
battalions to maintain discipline and morale, hoping the others would follow their 
example.  However, even with this additional support, according to General Müffling, the 
number of deserters at the battle of Waterloo was as high as 10,000.171  Out of a total 
force of around 70, 000, this was a significant number.     
 Wellington also encountered a huge problem during Uxbridge’s heavy cavalry 
charge, which suppressed d’Erlon’s infantry attacks early in the battle.  While the cavalry 
charge rendered the majority of the French infantry temporarily unable to fight, their 
success was short lived; the cavalrymen, known for being overly zealous, continued to 
charge well past the line of conflict, into enemy territory.  The French cavalry seized this 
opportunity to demolish the Allied heavy cavalry, a small part of which Vivian and 
Vandaleur’s light cavalry brigades managed to save from utter destruction.  A couple of 
days after arriving in Paris after the battle of Waterloo, Wellington remarked that, “…the 
cavalry of other European armies have won victories for their generals, but mine have 
invariably got me into scrapes.  It is true that they have always fought gallantly and 
bravely, and have generally got themselves out of their difficulties by sheer pluck.”172  
Marshal Excelmann, who led the Second Cavalry Corps at Waterloo, remarked that, 
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“Your [British] horses are the finest in the world, and your men ride better than any 
continental soldiers… [However] the greatest deficiency is in your officers, who have 
nothing to recommend them but their dash and sitting well in their saddles.”173  
Wellington could not prevent his cavalry officers from acting without considering the 
consequences.  Many of the officers’ families had bought their commissions; they were 
young and inexperienced, focused more on the glory and romanticism of battle than the 
actual tactical advantages.  This was a dangerous liability for Wellington, who, as a result 
of Uxbridge’s foolhardy cavalry charge, was left without the support of heavy cavalry for 
the rest of the battle, forced to improvise with only light cavalry and the few heavy 
cavalry remaining from the butchery following their first and only charge.  Captain 
Gronow observed that, “The Duke of Wellington was perfectly furious that this arm [the 
household brigade] had been engaged without his orders, and lost not a moment in 
sending them to the rear, where they remained during the rest of the day.”174  Wellington 
did not tolerate insubordination in so much as he could prevent it, and was quick to 
reprimand those officers who stepped out of line.  
Wellington fought flexibly at Waterloo.  His plan involved the defense of a 
position, but he made most of his decisions during the battle in response to enemy 
actions.  His diligent command over the specific movements of his troops in battle 
allowed him to respond to enemy movements in a timely, efficient manner.  Sergeant-
Major Cotton described such an instance, immediately following the KGL troops’ 
capitulation of the farm of La Haye Sainte, as they were attempting to escape the French 
pursuit: 
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Some of our light cavalry attempted to rescue the Germans; and our 95th, 
who had previously pointed their rifles at the cuirassiers, but had 
suspended their fire through fear of destroying our own infantry, now let 
fly and entirely cleared the whole front.  Their skirmishers then moved to 
the left, towards Halkett’s brigade and the 1st guards; the eagle eye of the 
Duke saw it, and he ordered the guards to form line and drive the enemy 
off, which they did, when some cuirassiers moved off, receiving the fire 
from the squares of the guards, as well as from those of the 52d and 
95th.175 
 
Wellington had an uncanny ability to observe those events in a battle which would prove 
to be significant.  This allowed him to distinguish the less threatening enemy movements 
and focus only on the important ones.   
 One of the most striking differences between Napoleon’s and Wellington’s 
actions on the 18th was that Wellington maintained a fresh reserve force throughout the 
entire battle.  The Prussians forced Napoleon to deploy the majority of his reserve force 
on his left wing.  Wellington understood the importance of keeping a fresh reserve force 
for the final attack; although Napoleon understood this as well, the Prussians’ arrival did 
not permit him to reserve the large force he had wanted.  Wellington did not deploy his 
reserves unnecessarily; he had to distinguish in which situations relief was essential and 
which could continue fighting despite dwindling forces.  Following a particularly 
destructive attack from the French cuirassiers, Wellington rode up to General Halkett’s 
Brigade and asked, “‘Well Halket[t], how do you get on?’ The general replied, ‘My Lord, 
we are dreadfully cut up; can you not relieve us for a little while?’ ‘Impossible,’ said the 
Duke. ‘Very well, my Lord’, said the general; ‘we’ll stand till the last man falls!’”176  It 
was so important to ensure that reserves were not wasted at the battle of Waterloo, given 
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how numerically even the Allied and French armies were.  However, when reserves 
proved necessary, Wellington deployed them skillfully.  Rifleman Kincaid describes the 
vacancies left by the foreign troops that had been deployed in the Allied line following 
the counterattack of the French cavalry, following the British cavalry attacks on d’Erlon’s 
infantry columns: “Our division got considerably reduced in numbers during the last 
attack; but Lord Wellington’s fostering hand sent Sir John Lambert to our support with 
the sixth division and we now stood prepared for another and a more desperate 
struggle.”177  Having the option of sending in reserves is essential, particularly in a battle 
when the battalions in one’s army are not as dependable as one might hope.  The soldiers 
had a great amount of confidence in their leader; they knew if Wellington believed that 
they could continue fighting without reserves, that it would be possible.  His reputation as 
an extremely competent battlefield commander comforted his troops to a great extent. 
 On the battlefield of Waterloo, Wellington ensured that he could always be at the 
scene of the action where he would be most needed; he had an impeccable personal 
command over the battle.  His active role in the battle was facilitated by his mobility on 
horseback and his group of staff officers, numbering at least forty; this group of personal 
staff, the Adjutant and Quartermaster Generals, the commanding officers of the artillery 
and engineers and all of their aides-de-camp ensured that his orders would reach even the 
farthest corners of the battlefield without delay.178  This prevented most errors in 
communication and kept all units on the battlefield informed as to their role in the 
combat.  Captain Basil Jackson of the Royal Staff Corps was one of these officers, who 
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was able to observe the Duke’s movements throughout the battle.  He remarked on the 
calm, collected nature of Wellington: 
...nothing that occurred seemed to produce any effect on the Duke, whom I 
had frequent opportunities of observing, as he would often turn and 
countermarch, thereby closely passing all who followed.  His countenance 
and demeanour were at all times quite calm, rarely speaking to anyone, 
save to give an order, or send a message; indeed, he generally rode quite 
alone… whilst his eye kept scanning intently those of his great 
opponent.179 
 
Wellington embodied confidence at the battle of Waterloo; most soldiers had the 
opportunity to observe him at some point during the battle and most of these sources took 
note of his quiet, calculated manner of commanding the battle.  He made sure that he 
could see all enemy movements in order to determine how best to respond to them; this 
required that he not remain stationary for the duration of the battle, but ride along his 
lines, seizing control of his troop movements.  His presence proved to be the most critical 
when troops were on the point of fleeing.  When, in the early evening, the French forced 
Lord Alten’s division back beyond the crest of the ridge after a fierce attack, they 
desperately needed additional support; Cotton recalled that, “At this critical moment 
Wellington galloped to the spot, and addressing himself to the Brunswickers, succeeded, 
by the electrifying influence of his voice and presence, in rallying the discomfited 
columns…”180  Wellington ensured that his troops felt his presence constantly, whether it 
be through seeing him rally troops or receiving orders from him.  He never allowed any 
unit to feel forgotten or alone.  For the final attack he rode along the British line, ordering 
a general advance which inspired his exhausted men who had been fighting for so long.  
Cotton explained that during the final attack of the French Imperial Guard, “The enemy 
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pressed on until within about fifty yards of Halkett’s brigade, and the British foot-guards, 
who were lying down, quietly awaiting the band of veteran heroes.  Wellington then gave 
the words, ‘Up guards, make ready!’ and ordered general Maitland to attack.”181  This 
personal involvement in the final attack added the additional boost of morale that sent his 
soldiers into an excited and determined charge.  Jac Weller explains that the culmination 
of the battle had been produced through Wellington’s personal involvement; “the 
counter-attack which swept Napoleon’s Grand Army from the crest of the Waterloo 
position into oblivion was largely the result of the professional military ability of the 
Allied Commander-in-Chief at battalion and brigade level and his intuitive grasp of 
where he was most needed throughout eight long hours of combat.”182  Wellington’s 
vigilance allowed him to remain in constant control of his forces, responding to enemy 
movements in an efficient and effective manner.  
 As in the battle of Salamanca, Wellington went where his army needed him most, 
disregarding any resulting personal danger, incurred as a part of his duty.  Even the 
French observed his courage in the face of dangerous situations; Pontécoulant explained 
that,  
…they say that at the hottest moment of the action, his chief of Staff, who 
had seen him expose himself to bullets and cannon balls like a common 
soldier, went and asked him which instructions he had for his successor, 
should he die before the end of the battle: ‘Hold here, he responded, until 
the last man and until the last cartridge; there are no other orders to give 
him.’183 
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Wellington understood that some things were worth risking everything; he committed 
himself wholeheartedly to his obligations as a military commander.  Basil Jackson related 
a particularly striking memory of the Duke during an attack of the left of La Haye Sainte 
between 3:00 and 4:00pm: 
All the staff, except a single aide-de-camp, had received a signal to keep 
back, in order not to attract the enemy’s fire; we remained, therefore, 
under the brow of the elevated ground, and, the better to keep out of 
observation, dismounted.  As I looked over my saddle, I could just trace 
the outlines of the Duke and his horse amidst the smoke, standing very 
near the Highlanders of Picton’s division, bearing a resemblance to the 
statue in Hyde Park when particularly shrouded by fog, while the balls- 
and they came thickly- hissed harmlessly over our heads. It was a time of 
intense anxiety, for had the Duke fallen, heaven only knows what might 
have been the result of the fight!184 
 
Wellington, in exposing himself to the dangers faced by his men, inspired an unparalleled 
confidence in him.  While the risk was great, each man in his army could be proud of his 
personal fortitude and commitment to his army. 
 Wellington had an unsurpassable ability to inspire his troops.  His cool, confident 
demeanor eased the fears of the Allied soldiers; they could see that he did not panic, even 
with such huge responsibilities, so they could feel reassured that they could also remain 
calm and perform their tasks to the utmost.  During the French cavalry attacks on the 
Allied infantry squares, Sergeant-Major Cotton claimed that,  
Whenever the Duke came, which at this momentous period was often, 
there was a low whisper in the ranks, ‘Here’s the Duke!’ and all was 
steady as on parade.  No matter what the havock and destruction might be, 
the Duke was always the coolest man there: in the words of an eyewitness 
of this bloody scene, the Duke was coolness personified.185 
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Wellington’s confidence inspired his men throughout the battle, but particularly during 
the final pursuit of the retreating Imperial Guard.  Rifleman Kincaid described that,  
Presently a cheer, which we knew to be British, commenced far to the 
right, and made everyone prick up his ears—it was Lord Wellington’s 
long-wished-for orders to advance; it gradually approached, growing 
louder as it grew near—we took it up by instinct, charged through the 
hedge down upon the old knoll, sending our adversaries flying a the point 
of the bayonet.  Lord Wellington galloped up to us at the instant, and our 
men began to cheer him; but he called out, ‘No cheering, my lads, but 
forward, and complete your victory!’186 
 
Such enthusiasm was overwhelming, as the remains of Wellington’s battered army drove 
off the elite Imperial Guard of France.  Wellington’s inspiring final ride along his battle 
line provided the extra boost of morale and energy necessary to pursue the French troops, 
at least until Marshal Blücher and the Prussians took over the pursuit beyond La Belle 
Alliance.  Christopher Hibbert claims that, “Everywhere he infected men, near the limit 
of endurance, with courage and confidence.”187 
 Wellington’s personal leadership at the battle of Waterloo is undeniably one of 
the finest demonstrations of active battlefield command of its time. His calm countenance 
and personal involvement in troop movements inspired his soldiers with confidence, 
increasing their potential.  Risking his life for the proper leadership of his army displays 
the kind of dedication that is essential to successful battlefield command.  Jac Weller 
observes that, “If any other man had directed the Anglo-Dutch Army, Napoleon would 
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probably have ended his days as Emperor of the French.”188  Wellington’s abilities as a 
battlefield commander motivated the British to victory at the battle of Waterloo.  
 The personal involvement of Napoleon and Wellington at the battle of Waterloo 
helped to determine the Allied victory and the French defeat.  Their actions at the battle 
of Waterloo differ greatly.  The two commanders began the battle with similar resources, 
each with similar numbers of troops; if anything, Wellington had a disadvantage, because 
many of his foreign troops were insufficiently trained, had questionable loyalties, and an 
inclination for desertion.  The two commanders fought in the style that suited each of 
them best: Wellington fighting a defensive battle and Napoleon attacking on the 
offensive; however, instead of exploiting the advantages of his extremely mobile forces, 
Napoleon elected for a head-on collision with Wellington’s infantry, the strongest 
defensive force of the era.  Wellington determinedly rode along his battle lines, ensuring 
that he could be of use wherever he went, while Napoleon remained essentially 
stationary, observing his battle from afar and allowing Marshal Ney to take care of the 
majority of the functional command of the battle.   
 Napoleon’s fatal mistakes at Waterloo can be attributed to miscommunication, 
laxity of command, poor health, and overconfidence.  Customarily, Napoleon saved a 
large reserve force for his final attacks.  At Waterloo, however, his misjudgment of the 
ability of the Prussian army to regroup and join the battle, two days after their defeat at 
Ligny, required him to deploy a large part of his reserve force to a part of the battlefield 
that he had not anticipated being a dangerous area.  As a result, when the time came to 
deal his final blow, he had to do so with a severely diminished force, against an already 
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sturdy Allied defense which Wellington had strengthened during the time that Napoleon 
had been indecisive.  Wellington had plenty of reserves, even at the end of the battle, 
because he had planned strategically for every possible scenario; he even had a fresh 
force of 17,000 men deployed at Hal that never fought in the battle.  While some scholars 
criticize Wellington for this, he left this strong force at Hal as a final line of defense 
between Waterloo and Brussels, should Napoleon defeat him.  Napoleon did not seem to 
have considered the possibility of defeat; his army retired in a mass of wild, rampant 
confusion and congestion, the only troops remaining in orderly formation being the 
troops of the Imperial Guard.   
 Napoleon’s laissez-faire attitude which led to his poor performance at the battle of 
Waterloo can perhaps be explained by his declining health.  Wellington displayed a 
consistency with his earlier career in his dedication to the active command of the battle of 
Waterloo.  Napoleon’s officers, however, noticed a distinct change from the active, 
sharp-eyed general who had led them to their unexpected victory at Austerlitz.  This 
inconsistency in leadership cost the French army dearly on June 18.  
 
Conclusions 
 Napoleon and Wellington fought the battle of Waterloo with staggeringly 
different styles of command.  Wellington maintained his active involvement with all 
aspects of the battle, as he had done at Salamanca and countless other battles prior to 
Waterloo.  Napoleon’s command style, on the other hand, changed dramatically from 
what it had been at Austerlitz and many of his other, earlier battles.  These two 
individuals had a profound influence on the outcome of the battle at Waterloo; their 
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personal leadership, or lack thereof, directly influenced the victory or defeat of their 
armies.   
Napoleon’s lethargic actions on June 18, whether a result of his strained health, 
mental exhaustion, or simply a coincidental unfortunate series of events, caused rampant 
miscommunication within the French army and allowed him to make many detrimental 
tactical decisions.  Napoleon blamed his officers for his loss at Waterloo while he was in 
exile on St Helena; however, only the feeble craftsman blames his tools.  Placing the 
blame on his subordinates undermined his supreme command, or at least the illusion of it 
that he wished to convey.  The Napoleon of Austerlitz fought with ingenuity and tactical 
prowess, ensuring that his inferior numbers crushed the numerous enemy forces, despite 
all odds.  At Waterloo, he exchanged this adept, innovative command style for a basic, 
brute force, frontal attack.  In doing so, he betrayed his earlier ideal; he did not behave as 
the able-bodied sharp-eyed leader of the French nation.  Instead he took a huge risk, 
thrusting his weakened forces against the strong Allied defenses for one last shot at glory 
and European domination.   
 Wellington remained consistent with his traditional command technique, as he 
had demonstrated at the battle of Salamanca; he did as much as he could himself, always 
being on the spot to move troops personally, oversee the deployment of reserves, and 
ensure that his troops carried out his orders to the last detail.  He fought a carefully 
planned battle, where he prepared for the inevitable surprises that occur in such battles.  
As a result, he was prepared for anything that Napoleon could throw at him.  He even 
planned his battlefield deployments, so that the weaker, foreign troops would not ever be 
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isolated from the stronger British and German veterans.  Wellington worked within the 
confines of his own resources, never underestimating the abilities of the French Emperor.   
Waterloo, fought by any other two men, would have yielded quite different 
results.  The contributions of Napoleon and Wellington dramatically altered the fates of 
the two, reasonably evenly matched armies on June 18, 1815.  These two men are proof 
of the importance of Great Men within a historical event.  Had lesser men commanded 
either army, the battle could have had a drastically different outcome.  While structural 
elements are undeniably important, one cannot oversimplify the effects of individual 
agency on historical events.  Wellington’s talents and Napoleon’s unfortunate 
shortcomings played an extremely significant role in the outcome of the battle of 
Waterloo; they are evidence that individuals matter, that Great Men can shape the course 
of history.   
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Appendix 
Map 1: The Battle of Austerlitz, December 2, 1805— Troop Dispositions at 10a.m. 
and 2p.m. 
 
Palacios, Rafael. The Battle of Austerlitz, December 2, 1805 [map]. In Trevor N. Dupuy. 
The Battle of Austerlitz: Napoleon’s Greatest Victory. New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1968, 67. 
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Map 2: The Battle of Salamanca, July 22, 1812—location of the troops between 9a.m. 
and 11a.m. 
 
 
 
Sarramon, Jean. Map from La Battaille des Arapiles [map]. Scale not given. In Rory 
Muir. Salamanca 1812. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001, 57. 
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Map 3: The Battlefield of Waterloo, June 18, 1815 
 
 
Weller, Jac. The Battlefield of Waterloo, 18 June, 1815. In Jac Weller. Wellington at 
Waterloo. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1967, 232. 
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